RE: IESG feedback on core drafts.

["Howard Chu" <hyc%highlandsun.com@localhost>]

> -----Original Message-----
> From: ietf-ssh-owner%netbsd.org@localhost [mailto:ietf-ssh-owner%netbsd.org@localhost]On Behalf
Of Eric Rescorla

> Some detailed comments,

> This sentence is ungrammatical.
>
> "Joseph Galbraith" <galb-list%vandyke.com@localhost> writes:

> >    With ciphers operating in CBC mode is theoretically
> >    vulnerable to choosen cipher-text attacks because of
> >    the high predicability of the start of packet sequence.

Likewise. Aside from "chosen" it's still unparsable.

> >    However, this attack is still relatively hard enough, and
> >    requires a sufficiently high number of packets, to be safe
> >    in the short term.  Ciphers with larger block sizes are
> >    less vulnerable the ciphers with smaller block sizes.
> >    [Is this true?]
> What attack are you talking about here? The Rogaway attack?
> Perhaps you need a citation and some explanation?
>
>
> >    Effort is underway to standardize the use of CTR mode
> >    ciphers in the SSH protocol.  When this work is completed,
> >    implementors SHOULD support it.
> >
> >    In addition, the CBC mode attack can be mitigated by
> >    ensuring the an SSH_MSG_IGNORE packet preceeds any real
		    ^^^ that

  -- Howard Chu
  Chief Architect, Symas Corp.       Director, Highland Sun
  http://www.symas.com               http://highlandsun.com/hyc
  Symas: Premier OpenSource Development and Support