Re: I-D ACTION:draft-galb-secsh-publickey-subsystem-02.txt

["Joel N. Weber II" <ietf-secsh%joelweber.com@localhost>]

Under ``2.1 Opening the Public-Key Subsystem'', it is said that
clients SHOULD reject a request for this subsystem.  I suspect that
that should instead be a MUST.

Under ``2.2 Requests'', is there a good reason to disallow a client
sending more than one request and expecting that the server will
respond to them in order?  (If there is, I think the draft should
probably have a sentence explaining what problem that requirement is
solving; if not, pipelined requests should be allowed.)

Editorial nitpicking:

``3. Public-Key Subsystem Operations'' says that four requests are
defined, including ``command'', but I think ``command'' got absorbed
into the key attributes.

A case-insensitive grep for ``secsh'' in the core drafts doesn't
appear to find any places where the protocol's proper name is
``SECSH''.  I believe that ``the Secure Shell protocol'' and ``the SSH
protocol'' both appear, though.