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Re: Some questions about "SSH Transport Layer Encryption Modes"





On Sunday, October 19, 2003 12:31:12 +0200 Markus Friedl <markus%openbsd.org@localhost> wrote:

On Sat, Oct 18, 2003 at 06:23:25PM -0400, Jeffrey Hutzelman wrote:
     More application data may be sent after the SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS packet
     has been sent; key exchange does not affect the protocols that lie
     above the SSH transport layer.

That last sentence is _extremely_ ambiguous.  It could be read to mean
the  behaviour which Markus described, in which application data (and,
in fact,  anything above the transport layer) is simply suspended until
rekeying is  complete.  Or, it could be read to mean that application
data continues to  flow during the rekey.  I think if I were a new SSH
implementor, working in  a vacuum, I'd read it to mean that higher-layer
protocols are _not_  suspended.  So if that's not what we mean, then
maybe this needs to be

but that could result in the higher layer using the
old keying material forever.

Yes, it does. Of course, that would also happen if neither side decided to do a rekey. Once one side starts a rekey, it could certainly _choose_ not to send any application data until it sends a SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS. But as I read the document, it should be prepared to continue to receive application data using the old keys more or less indefinitely. This isn't an interop problem; it just means that one side can choose never to take new keys into use and instead continue to use the old keys for "too long".

That said, I'm not actually advocating either behaviour over the other. However, I do think the document needs clarification in this regard. I've been active in this working group for a while now; I've written the specification for a key exchange method, and reviewed a special-purpose host key algorithm which depends on behaviour during a rekey. Until this discussion started, I believed the spec permitted higher-layer protocols to continue during a rekey. If I made that mistake, I wonder how many implementors also did.


clarified.  Bleah.

I wrote earlier:

Yes, your mail was quite clear on what the behaviour should be. But email isn't good enough; future implementors (and probably even some present ones) are going to work from the spec, not the mailing list discussion.

-- Jeff



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