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new drafts



I just sucked over the new drafts.  On diffing them with the previous
versions, I see some things of note.

In assignednumbers-08, fourth line of 4.3.4:

   o  The range of 0xFF000000 to 0xFEFFFFFF is to be used in conjunction

Surely that should be FE000000.  The same error is repeated six lines
further down.

In connect-21, I see the line

   to 0x0xFDFFFFFF MUST be done through the IETF CONSENSUS method as

s/0x0x/0x/, surely.

The description surrounding and following the previous line appears to
repeat the "0xFF000000 instead of 0xFE000000" error from above,
multiple times.  Specifically, these lines

   range of 0xFF000000 to 0xFFFFFFFF, this range will be split in two
   o  The range of 0xFF000000 to 0xFEFFFFFF is to be used in conjunction
      the range of 0xFF000000 to 0xFEFFFFFF.  Naturally, if the server

look to me as though they need fixing (even though the first of them
makes sense in isolation, in context, I believe it is wrong).

In connect-21 again, just before the beginning of 5.3, I see

   described in [RFC2434].  As is noted, the actual instructions to the
   IANA is in [SSH-NUMBERS].

There is a plural/singular clash here between "the...instructions" and
"is".

In transport-20, near line 515, I find

    implementations MUST allow the algorithm for each direction to be
    independently selected for each direction, if multiple algorithms are

Isn't the repetition of "each direction" redundant here?  It reads a
little oddly to me, at least.

Later in transport-20, around line 550, I see

   and the following 8 bytes for the final encryption.  This requires 24
   bytes of key data (of which 168 bits are actually used).  To
   implement CBC mode, outer chaining MUST be used (i.e., there is only
   one initialization vector).  This is a block cipher with 8 byte
   blocks.  This algorithm is defined in [FIPS-46-3].  Note that this
   algorithm does not meet the specifications that SSH encryption
   algorithms should use keys of 128 bits or more.  However, this

It seems..odd..to me to describe an algorithm and note that it uses 168
bits of key data, then note that this does not meet a spec requiring
128 bits or more - it looks to me as though it meets it with 40 bits to
spare.  (It may not have 128 bits worth of security, but if that's the
issue, it seems to me it should be made clear in the text.  As it is,
it just looks confused - it certainly does use a key "of 128 bits or
more".

Around line 870, I see

   authentication" if, in order to prove its autenticity, the server

s/autenticity/authenticity/ surely?

Somewhere near line 905, I see text (itself unchanged) which says that
supported algorithms "MUST be listed in order of preference", but does
not make it explicit whether this is most-preferred-first or
least-preferred-first.  (The first sentence of the next paragraph
helps, but I'd prefer to see this change to something like "...order of
preference, from most to least".)

In userauth-23, lines 208 and 209 are

      string    user name in UTF-8, normalized according to
      [I-D.ietf-sasl-saslprep]

which, while not excessively problematic in isolation, would look
significantly better to me in context if the bracketed I-D reference
were indented so its open bracket falls under the u of "user name".

Similar remarks apply to lines 454 and 455, and lines 539 and 540.

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