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Re: applying AES-GCM to secure shell: proposed "tweak"



>> * except that it won't - OpenSSH just had to switch off a few
>> channel and global extensions for all but other OpenSSH peers
>> because some other implementations will disconnect as soon as they
>> see an extension message that they do not recognise.

> This is really unfortunate, given that RFC4253 is quite clear on how
> unrecognized extensions must be handled.  I would propose that we
> solve this problem once and for all by using a _single_ "magic"
> cipher name, or possibly a magic cookie in the version banner
> comments, to indicate that unrecognized messages are handled
> correctly and/or that option negotiation is supported.

That's a good one, right up there with RFC 3514.

(For those who don't get Jeff's humour: what's to prevent buggy
implementations of the "yes I get this right" claim?)

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