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Re: Rekey issue
Mouse <mouse%Rodents-Montreal.ORG@localhost> writes:
> I can see at least three ways of dealing with this: (1) when rekeying,
> always accept the host key regardless of what it is, (2) when rekeying,
> require that the host key be what it was the first time around, always
> accepting if it is and erroring if not, and (3) when rekeying, behave
> as normal except that a second copy of the host key from the first time
> around is, effectively, added as a trusted key for the host.
I think I'm doing (3). That's what made most sense to me when I
implemented it, but maybe there are better options. When an unknown key
is received at the initial keyexchange, there are three possible
outcomes depending on the user interaction:
A. Disconnect.
B. Accepted only for this connection. Key is added to the in-memory list
of trusted host keys.
C. Accepted. As above, but in addition, the key is appended to the host
key list on disk.
Regards,
/Niels
--
Niels Möller. PGP-encrypted email is preferred. Keyid C0B98E26.
Internet email is subject to wholesale government surveillance.
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