Hi,
The draft draft-mu-curdle-ssh-xmss-00 "XMSS public key algorithms for the Secure Shell (SSH) protocol" seems to encounter significant opposition to be adopted. The main reasons are that the xmss signature scheme is very specific to use cases that seems not easily in scope with ssh, than the management of the private key states when used in conjunction of ssh seems problematic.
While the WG does not seems to believe this work should happen in the WG, the chairs would like to understand the status of development using xmss in ssh to ensure the IANA registry does not allocate in the future the code point used for XMSS. If such implementation existed, the chairs would welcome any advises to avoid code point collision. Possible ways (but not limited ) are:
* informational publication
* individual publication
* simply reserving code point
* ...
Yours,
Rich and Daniel
I have been convinced by others' feedback that the safe use of a stateful signature scheme in SSH would require the state to be encapsulated in a dedicated authentication device. This could be (not limited to) a USB token or a TPM. It's clear that such a device could exist, but does not currently exist, and the IETF process would require it to exist in order to proceed with standardization._______________________________________________On Fri, Nov 29, 2019 at 12:13 PM Salz, Rich <rsalz%akamai.com@localhost> wrote:Is there anyone in favor of adoption beyond the original submitters? Please speak up now.
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