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[pkgsrc/trunk]: pkgsrc/security/gnupg Security fix for CVE-2006-3082:
details: https://anonhg.NetBSD.org/pkgsrc/rev/d1fe2ed107bf
branches: trunk
changeset: 515091:d1fe2ed107bf
user: salo <salo%pkgsrc.org@localhost>
date: Sat Jun 24 14:20:29 2006 +0000
description:
Security fix for CVE-2006-3082:
"parse-packet.c in GnuPG (gpg) 1.4.3 and 1.9.20, and earlier versions,
allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (gpg crash) and
possibly overwrite memory via a message packet with a large length,
which could lead to an integer overflow, as demonstrated using the
--no-armor option."
Patch from GnuPG CVS repository.
Bump PKGREVISION.
diffstat:
security/gnupg/Makefile | 3 ++-
security/gnupg/distinfo | 3 ++-
security/gnupg/patches/patch-ba | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diffs (57 lines):
diff -r 6df73c749708 -r d1fe2ed107bf security/gnupg/Makefile
--- a/security/gnupg/Makefile Sat Jun 24 13:37:08 2006 +0000
+++ b/security/gnupg/Makefile Sat Jun 24 14:20:29 2006 +0000
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
-# $NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.85 2006/04/13 18:23:37 jlam Exp $
+# $NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.86 2006/06/24 14:20:29 salo Exp $
DISTNAME= gnupg-1.4.3
+PKGREVISION= 1
CATEGORIES= security
MASTER_SITES= ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/gnupg/ \
ftp://ftp.planetmirror.com/pub/gnupg/ \
diff -r 6df73c749708 -r d1fe2ed107bf security/gnupg/distinfo
--- a/security/gnupg/distinfo Sat Jun 24 13:37:08 2006 +0000
+++ b/security/gnupg/distinfo Sat Jun 24 14:20:29 2006 +0000
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-$NetBSD: distinfo,v 1.39 2006/04/04 21:16:37 wiz Exp $
+$NetBSD: distinfo,v 1.40 2006/06/24 14:20:29 salo Exp $
SHA1 (gnupg-1.4.3.tar.bz2) = 9e96b36e4f4d1e8bc5028c99fac674482cbdb370
RMD160 (gnupg-1.4.3.tar.bz2) = f6d328785f41b74f97d25305c6fe95ad45bb70a5
@@ -9,3 +9,4 @@
SHA1 (patch-aa) = 91d55ca22b58e8a1f3c17a2fd0ad888d4c85c6cf
SHA1 (patch-ab) = 29a7d0b736322eb1ecf0925a2419b513f323000e
SHA1 (patch-ak) = 89a6a7552104f4d5b97a98889da88fca68c54f31
+SHA1 (patch-ba) = d32db008ec704dacf382da4f43ad6b3f0de88dcb
diff -r 6df73c749708 -r d1fe2ed107bf security/gnupg/patches/patch-ba
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000
+++ b/security/gnupg/patches/patch-ba Sat Jun 24 14:20:29 2006 +0000
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+$NetBSD: patch-ba,v 1.1 2006/06/24 14:20:29 salo Exp $
+
+Security fix for CVE-2006-3082, from GnuPG CVS repository.
+
+--- g10/parse-packet.c.orig 2005-12-06 14:22:19.000000000 +0100
++++ g10/parse-packet.c 2006-06-24 16:09:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -1972,6 +1972,20 @@
+ {
+ byte *p;
+
++ /* Cap the size of a user ID at 2k: a value absurdly large enough
++ that there is no sane user ID string (which is printable text
++ as of RFC2440bis) that won't fit in it, but yet small enough to
++ avoid allocation problems. A large pktlen may not be
++ allocatable, and a very large pktlen could actually cause our
++ allocation to wrap around in xmalloc to a small number. */
++
++ if(pktlen>2048)
++ {
++ log_error("packet(%d) too large\n", pkttype);
++ iobuf_skip_rest(inp, pktlen, 0);
++ return G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
++ }
++
+ packet->pkt.user_id = xmalloc_clear(sizeof *packet->pkt.user_id + pktlen);
+ packet->pkt.user_id->len = pktlen;
+ packet->pkt.user_id->ref=1;
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