[pkgsrc/trunk]: pkgsrc/security/openssh openssh: update to 9.0.1.

[wiz <wiz%pkgsrc.org@localhost>]

details:   https://anonhg.NetBSD.org/pkgsrc/rev/8b6fe8133fb9
branches:  trunk
changeset: 379392:8b6fe8133fb9
user:      wiz <wiz%pkgsrc.org@localhost>
date:      Sun May 15 19:21:55 2022 +0000

description:
openssh: update to 9.0.1.

Changes since OpenSSH 8.9
=========================

This release is focused on bug fixing.

Potentially-incompatible changes
--------------------------------

This release switches scp(1) from using the legacy scp/rcp protocol
to using the SFTP protocol by default.

Legacy scp/rcp performs wildcard expansion of remote filenames (e.g.
"scp host:* .") through the remote shell. This has the side effect of
requiring double quoting of shell meta-characters in file names
included on scp(1) command-lines, otherwise they could be interpreted
as shell commands on the remote side.

This creates one area of potential incompatibility: scp(1) when using
the SFTP protocol no longer requires this finicky and brittle quoting,
and attempts to use it may cause transfers to fail. We consider the
removal of the need for double-quoting shell characters in file names
to be a benefit and do not intend to introduce bug-compatibility for
legacy scp/rcp in scp(1) when using the SFTP protocol.

Another area of potential incompatibility relates to the use of remote
paths relative to other user's home directories, for example -
"scp host:~user/file /tmp". The SFTP protocol has no native way to
expand a ~user path. However, sftp-server(8) in OpenSSH 8.7 and later
support a protocol extension "expand-path () openssh com" to support
this.

In case of incompatibility, the scp(1) client may be instructed to use
the legacy scp/rcp using the -O flag.

New features
------------

 * ssh(1), sshd(8): use the hybrid Streamlined NTRU Prime + x25519 key
   exchange method by default ("sntrup761x25519-sha512 () openssh com").
   The NTRU algorithm is believed to resist attacks enabled by future
   quantum computers and is paired with the X25519 ECDH key exchange
   (the previous default) as a backstop against any weaknesses in
   NTRU Prime that may be discovered in the future. The combination
   ensures that the hybrid exchange offers at least as good security
   as the status quo.

   We are making this change now (i.e. ahead of cryptographically-
   relevant quantum computers) to prevent "capture now, decrypt
   later" attacks where an adversary who can record and store SSH
   session ciphertext would be able to decrypt it once a sufficiently
   advanced quantum computer is available.

 * sftp-server(8): support the "copy-data" extension to allow server-
   side copying of files/data, following the design in
   draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-extensions-00. bz2948

 * sftp(1): add a "cp" command to allow the sftp client to perform
   server-side file copies.

Bugfixes
--------

 * ssh(1), sshd(8): upstream: fix poll(2) spin when a channel's output
   fd closes without data in the channel buffer. bz3405 and bz3411

 * sshd(8): pack pollfd array in server listen/accept loop. Could
   cause the server to hang/spin when MaxStartups > RLIMIT_NOFILE

 * ssh-keygen(1): avoid NULL deref via the find-principals and
   check-novalidate operations. bz3409 and GHPR#307 respectively.

 * scp(1): fix a memory leak in argument processing. bz3404

 * sshd(8): don't try to resolve ListenAddress directives in the sshd
   re-exec path. They are unused after re-exec and parsing errors
   (possible for example if the host's network configuration changed)
   could prevent connections from being accepted.

 * sshd(8): when refusing a public key authentication request from a
   client for using an unapproved or unsupported signature algorithm
   include the algorithm name in the log message to make debugging
   easier.

Portability
-----------

 * sshd(8): refactor platform-specific locked account check, fixing
   an incorrect free() on platforms with both libiaf and shadow
   passwords (probably only Unixware) GHPR#284,

 * ssh(1), sshd(8): Fix possible integer underflow in scan_scaled(3)
   parsing of K/M/G/etc quantities. bz#3401.

 * sshd(8): provide killpg implementation (mostly for Tandem NonStop)
   GHPR#301.

 * Check for missing ftruncate prototype. GHPR#301

 * sshd(8): default to not using sandbox when cross compiling. On most
   systems poll(2) does not work when the number of FDs is reduced
   with setrlimit, so assume it doesn't when cross compiling and we
   can't run the test.  bz#3398.

 * sshd(8): allow ppoll_time64 in seccomp sandbox. Should fix sandbox
   violations on some (at least i386 and armhf) 32bit Linux platforms.
   bz#3396.

 * Improve detection of -fzero-call-used-regs=all support in
   configure script.

Security Near Miss
==================

 * sshd(8): fix an integer overflow in the user authentication path
   that, in conjunction with other logic errors, could have yielded
   unauthenticated access under difficult to exploit conditions.

   This situation is not exploitable because of independent checks in
   the privilege separation monitor. Privilege separation has been
   enabled by default in since openssh-3.2.2 (released in 2002) and
   has been mandatory since openssh-7.5 (released in 2017). Moreover,
   portable OpenSSH has used toolchain features available in most
   modern compilers to abort on signed integer overflow since
   openssh-6.5 (released in 2014).

   Thanks to Malcolm Stagg for finding and reporting this bug.

Potentially-incompatible changes
================================

 * sshd(8), portable OpenSSH only: this release removes in-built
   support for MD5-hashed passwords. If you require these on your
   system then we recommend linking against libxcrypt or similar.

 * This release modifies the FIDO security key middleware interface
   and increments SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR.

Changes since OpenSSH 8.8
=========================

This release includes a number of new features.

New features
------------

 * ssh(1), sshd(8), ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1): add a system for
   restricting forwarding and use of keys added to ssh-agent(1)
   A detailed description of the feature is available at
   https://www.openssh.com/agent-restrict.html and the protocol
   extensions are documented in the PROTOCOL and PROTOCOL.agent
   files in the source release.

 * ssh(1), sshd(8): add the sntrup761x25519-sha512%openssh.com@localhost hybrid
   ECDH/x25519 + Streamlined NTRU Prime post-quantum KEX to the
   default KEXAlgorithms list (after the ECDH methods but before the
   prime-group DH ones). The next release of OpenSSH is likely to
   make this key exchange the default method.

 * ssh-keygen(1): when downloading resident keys from a FIDO token,
   pass back the user ID that was used when the key was created and
   append it to the filename the key is written to (if it is not the
   default). Avoids keys being clobbered if the user created multiple
   resident keys with the same application string but different user
   IDs.

 * ssh-keygen(1), ssh(1), ssh-agent(1): better handling for FIDO keys
   on tokens that provide user verification (UV) on the device itself,
   including biometric keys, avoiding unnecessary PIN prompts.

 * ssh-keygen(1): add "ssh-keygen -Y match-principals" operation to
   perform matching of principals names against an allowed signers
   file. To be used towards a TOFU model for SSH signatures in git.

 * ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1): allow pin-required FIDO keys to be added
   to ssh-agent(1). $SSH_ASKPASS will be used to request the PIN at
   authentication time.

 * ssh-keygen(1): allow selection of hash at sshsig signing time
   (either sha512 (default) or sha256).

 * ssh(1), sshd(8): read network data directly to the packet input
   buffer instead of indirectly via a small stack buffer. Provides a
   modest performance improvement.

 * ssh(1), sshd(8): read data directly to the channel input buffer,
   providing a similar modest performance improvement.

 * ssh(1): extend the PubkeyAuthentication configuration directive to
   accept yes|no|unbound|host-bound to allow control over one of the
   protocol extensions used to implement agent-restricted keys.

Bugfixes
--------

 * sshd(8): document that CASignatureAlgorithms, ExposeAuthInfo and
   PubkeyAuthOptions can be used in a Match block. PR#277.

 * sshd(8): fix possible string truncation when constructing paths to
   .rhosts/.shosts files with very long user home directory names.

 * ssh-keysign(1): unbreak for KEX algorithms that use SHA384/512
   exchange hashes

 * ssh(1): don't put the TTY into raw mode when SessionType=none,
   avoids ^C being unable to kill such a session. bz3360

 * scp(1): fix some corner-case bugs in SFTP-mode handling of
   ~-prefixed paths.

 * ssh(1): unbreak hostbased auth using RSA keys. Allow ssh(1) to
   select RSA keys when only RSA/SHA2 signature algorithms are
   configured (this is the default case). Previously RSA keys were
   not being considered in the default case.

 * ssh-keysign(1): make ssh-keysign use the requested signature
   algorithm and not the default for the key type. Part of unbreaking
   hostbased auth for RSA/SHA2 keys.

 * ssh(1): stricter UpdateHostkey signature verification logic on
   the client- side. Require RSA/SHA2 signatures for RSA hostkeys
   except when RSA/SHA1 was explicitly negotiated during initial
   KEX; bz3375

 * ssh(1), sshd(8): fix signature algorithm selection logic for
   UpdateHostkeys on the server side. The previous code tried to
   prefer RSA/SHA2 for hostkey proofs of RSA keys, but missed some
   cases. This will use RSA/SHA2 signatures for RSA keys if the
   client proposed these algorithms in initial KEX. bz3375

 * All: convert all uses of select(2)/pselect(2) to poll(2)/ppoll(2).
   This includes the mainloops in ssh(1), ssh-agent(1), ssh-agent(1)
   and sftp-server(8), as well as the sshd(8) listen loop and all
   other FD read/writability checks. On platforms with missing or
   broken poll(2)/ppoll(2) syscalls a select(2)-based compat shim is
   available.

 * ssh-keygen(1): the "-Y find-principals" command was verifying key
   validity when using ca certs but not with simple key lifetimes
   within the allowed signers file.

 * ssh-keygen(1): make sshsig verify-time argument parsing optional

 * sshd(8): fix truncation in rhosts/shosts path construction.

 * ssh(1), ssh-agent(1): avoid xmalloc(0) for PKCS#11 keyid for ECDSA
   keys (we already did this for RSA keys). Avoids fatal errors for
   PKCS#11 libraries that return empty keyid, e.g. Microchip ATECC608B
   "cryptoauthlib"; bz#3364

 * ssh(1), ssh-agent(1): improve the testing of credentials against
   inserted FIDO: ask the token whether a particular key belongs to
   it in cases where the token supports on-token user-verification
   (e.g. biometrics) rather than just assuming that it will accept it.

   Will reduce spurious "Confirm user presence" notifications for key
   handles that relate to FIDO keys that are not currently inserted in at
   least some cases. bz3366

 * ssh(1), sshd(8): correct value for IPTOS_DSCP_LE. It needs to
   allow for the preceding two ECN bits. bz#3373

 * ssh-keygen(1): add missing -O option to usage() for the "-Y sign"
   option.

 * ssh-keygen(1): fix a NULL deref when using the find-principals
   function, when matching an allowed_signers line that contains a
   namespace restriction, but no restriction specified on the
   command-line

 * ssh-agent(1): fix memleak in process_extension(); oss-fuzz
   issue #42719

 * ssh(1): suppress "Connection to xxx closed" messages when LogLevel
   is set to "error" or above. bz3378

 * ssh(1), sshd(8): use correct zlib flags when inflate(3)-ing
   compressed packet data. bz3372

 * scp(1): when recursively transferring files in SFTP mode, create the
   destination directory if it doesn't already exist to match scp(1) in
   legacy RCP mode behaviour.

 * scp(1): many improvements in error message consistency between scp(1)
   in SFTP mode vs legacy RCP mode.

 * sshd(8): fix potential race in SIGTERM handling PR#289

 * ssh(1), ssh(8): since DSA keys are deprecated, move them to the
   end of the default list of public keys so that they will be tried
   last. PR#295

 * ssh-keygen(1): allow 'ssh-keygen -Y find-principals' to match
   wildcard principals in allowed_signers files

Portability
-----------

 * ssh(1), sshd(8): don't trust closefrom(2) on Linux. glibc's
   implementation does not work in a chroot when the kernel does not
   have close_range(2). It tries to read from /proc/self/fd and when
   that fails dies with an assertion of sorts. Instead, call
   close_range(2) directly from our compat code and fall back if
   that fails.  bz#3349,

 * OS X poll(2) is broken; use compat replacement. For character-
   special devices like /dev/null, Darwin's poll(2) returns POLLNVAL
   when polled with POLLIN. Apparently this is Apple bug 3710161 -
   not public but a websearch will find other OSS projects
   rediscovering it periodically since it was first identified in
   2005.

 * Correct handling of exceptfds/POLLPRI in our select(2)-based
   poll(2)/ppoll(2) compat implementation.

 * Cygwin: correct checking of mbstowcs() return value.

 * Add a basic SECURITY.md that refers people to the openssh.com
   website.

 * Enable additional compiler warnings and toolchain hardening flags,
   including -Wbitwise-instead-of-logical, -Wmisleading-indentation,
   -fzero-call-used-regs and -ftrivial-auto-var-init.

 * HP/UX. Use compat getline(3) on HP-UX 10.x, where the libc version
   is not reliable.

diffstat:

 security/openssh/Makefile                                |   5 +--
 security/openssh/distinfo                                |  14 ++++++------
 security/openssh/patches/patch-Makefile.in               |  15 +++---------
 security/openssh/patches/patch-configure.ac              |  18 ++++++++--------
 security/openssh/patches/patch-openbsd-compat_port-net.c |  17 +++++++++++++++
 security/openssh/patches/patch-openbsd-compat_port-tun.c |  17 ---------------
 6 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 47 deletions(-)

diffs (181 lines):

diff -r df48148a4314 -r 8b6fe8133fb9 security/openssh/Makefile
--- a/security/openssh/Makefile Sun May 15 19:12:24 2022 +0000
+++ b/security/openssh/Makefile Sun May 15 19:21:55 2022 +0000
@@ -1,8 +1,7 @@
-# $NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.271 2021/10/21 07:46:38 wiz Exp $
+# $NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.272 2022/05/15 19:21:55 wiz Exp $
 
-DISTNAME=              openssh-8.8p1
+DISTNAME=              openssh-9.0p1
 PKGNAME=               ${DISTNAME:S/p1/.1/}
-PKGREVISION=           1
 CATEGORIES=            security
 MASTER_SITES=          ${MASTER_SITE_OPENBSD:=OpenSSH/portable/}
 
diff -r df48148a4314 -r 8b6fe8133fb9 security/openssh/distinfo
--- a/security/openssh/distinfo Sun May 15 19:12:24 2022 +0000
+++ b/security/openssh/distinfo Sun May 15 19:21:55 2022 +0000
@@ -1,16 +1,16 @@
-$NetBSD: distinfo,v 1.114 2021/10/26 11:17:22 nia Exp $
+$NetBSD: distinfo,v 1.115 2022/05/15 19:21:55 wiz Exp $
 
-BLAKE2s (openssh-8.8p1.tar.gz) = 4b5720cdf7d86d36b41beb4162c02c37ad8a9d281728ab5ac4fa695af95ef7c1
-SHA512 (openssh-8.8p1.tar.gz) = d44cd04445f9c8963513b0d5a7e8348985114ff2471e119a6e344498719ef40f09c61c354888a3be9dabcb5870e5cbe5d3aafbb861dfa1d82a4952f3d233a8df
-Size (openssh-8.8p1.tar.gz) = 1815060 bytes
-SHA1 (patch-Makefile.in) = 13502b825c13c98b2ba3b84ff4bae9aa664b76b1
+BLAKE2s (openssh-9.0p1.tar.gz) = 6b1adf0decbf08f1b180517c08ab6f9859ebfc26778bbb3b65213beb8b73d5d5
+SHA512 (openssh-9.0p1.tar.gz) = 613ae95317e734868c6a60d9cc5af47a889baa3124bbdd2b31bb51dd6b57b136f4cfcb5604cca78a03bd500baab9b9b45eaf77e038b1ed776c86dce0437449a9
+Size (openssh-9.0p1.tar.gz) = 1822183 bytes
+SHA1 (patch-Makefile.in) = 70d6ca9c803b6193d0e340cb0518936a00e57492
 SHA1 (patch-clientloop.c) = 4e88fbd14db33f003eb93c30c682a017e102196e
 SHA1 (patch-config.h.in) = 7d1050743da7264763254b57938775c546c3baa5
-SHA1 (patch-configure.ac) = 321ef5ed83abe7e07d38026e096a10700b010ac8
+SHA1 (patch-configure.ac) = 65507029aa7570bcc1e588d022812e708ef5cd5d
 SHA1 (patch-defines.h) = bd8687a9a2857f3b8d15ae94095f27f9344003c4
 SHA1 (patch-loginrec.c) = 76f1e03182cbd18dd9ac0bdfcb6502eec7eb56a9
 SHA1 (patch-openbsd-compat_openbsd-compat.h) = bedbede16ab2fe918419c994ba15a20167b411b4
-SHA1 (patch-openbsd-compat_port-tun.c) = b2a0ce81a52b00f106198d549b5068a5e67092ef
+SHA1 (patch-openbsd-compat_port-net.c) = b2a0ce81a52b00f106198d549b5068a5e67092ef
 SHA1 (patch-sandbox-darwin.c) = c9a1fe2e4dbf98e929d983b4206a244e0e354b75
 SHA1 (patch-sshd.8) = 5bf48cd27cef8e8810b9dc7115f5180102a345d1
 SHA1 (patch-sshd.c) = 0c5725305cbab3855b52c1a63fe4e987ed14e44e
diff -r df48148a4314 -r 8b6fe8133fb9 security/openssh/patches/patch-Makefile.in
--- a/security/openssh/patches/patch-Makefile.in        Sun May 15 19:12:24 2022 +0000
+++ b/security/openssh/patches/patch-Makefile.in        Sun May 15 19:21:55 2022 +0000
@@ -1,17 +1,10 @@
-$NetBSD: patch-Makefile.in,v 1.6 2019/01/18 20:13:37 tnn Exp $
+$NetBSD: patch-Makefile.in,v 1.7 2022/05/15 19:21:56 wiz Exp $
 
 Removed install-sysconf as we handle that phase through post-install
 
---- Makefile.in.orig   2018-10-17 00:01:20.000000000 +0000
+--- Makefile.in.orig   2022-04-06 00:47:48.000000000 +0000
 +++ Makefile.in
-@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
- # uncomment if you run a non bourne compatible shell. Ie. csh
--#SHELL = @SH@
-+SHELL = @SH@
- 
- AUTORECONF=autoreconf
- 
-@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ top_srcdir=@top_srcdir@
+@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ abs_top_builddir=@abs_top_builddir@
  DESTDIR=
  VPATH=@srcdir@
  SSH_PROGRAM=@bindir@/ssh
@@ -20,7 +13,7 @@
  SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server
  SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign
  SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
-@@ -320,7 +320,7 @@ distprep: catman-do depend-check
+@@ -382,7 +382,7 @@ distprep: catman-do depend-check
        -rm -rf autom4te.cache .depend.bak
  
  install: $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS) install-files install-sysconf host-key check-config
diff -r df48148a4314 -r 8b6fe8133fb9 security/openssh/patches/patch-configure.ac
--- a/security/openssh/patches/patch-configure.ac       Sun May 15 19:12:24 2022 +0000
+++ b/security/openssh/patches/patch-configure.ac       Sun May 15 19:21:55 2022 +0000
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
-$NetBSD: patch-configure.ac,v 1.8 2019/05/01 17:59:56 maya Exp $
+$NetBSD: patch-configure.ac,v 1.9 2022/05/15 19:21:56 wiz Exp $
 
---- configure.ac.orig  2019-04-17 22:52:57.000000000 +0000
+--- configure.ac.orig  2022-04-06 00:47:48.000000000 +0000
 +++ configure.ac
-@@ -294,6 +294,9 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([rpath],
+@@ -340,6 +340,9 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([rpath],
        ]
  )
  
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
  # Allow user to specify flags
  AC_ARG_WITH([cflags],
        [  --with-cflags           Specify additional flags to pass to compiler],
-@@ -387,6 +390,7 @@ AC_CHECK_HEADERS([ \
+@@ -434,6 +437,7 @@ AC_CHECK_HEADERS([ \
        maillock.h \
        ndir.h \
        net/if_tun.h \
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
        netdb.h \
        netgroup.h \
        pam/pam_appl.h \
-@@ -1494,6 +1507,62 @@ else
+@@ -1601,6 +1605,62 @@ else
        AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
  fi
  
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@
  # Check whether user wants to use ldns
  LDNS_MSG="no"
  AC_ARG_WITH(ldns,
-@@ -5129,9 +5198,17 @@ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+@@ -5480,9 +5540,17 @@ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
  ])
  if test -z "$conf_wtmpx_location"; then
        if test x"$system_wtmpx_path" = x"no" ; then
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@
        AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([CONF_WTMPX_FILE], ["$conf_wtmpx_location"],
                [Define if you want to specify the path to your wtmpx file])
  fi
-@@ -5223,7 +5300,7 @@ echo "OpenSSH has been configured with t
+@@ -5580,7 +5648,7 @@ echo "OpenSSH has been configured with t
  echo "                     User binaries: $B"
  echo "                   System binaries: $C"
  echo "               Configuration files: $D"
@@ -112,11 +112,11 @@
  echo "                      Manual pages: $F"
  echo "                          PID file: $G"
  echo "  Privilege separation chroot path: $H"
-@@ -5245,6 +5322,7 @@ echo "                       PAM support
+@@ -5602,6 +5670,7 @@ echo "                       PAM support
  echo "                   OSF SIA support: $SIA_MSG"
  echo "                 KerberosV support: $KRB5_MSG"
  echo "                   SELinux support: $SELINUX_MSG"
 +echo "              TCP Wrappers support: $TCPW_MSG"
- echo "              MD5 password support: $MD5_MSG"
  echo "                   libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG"
  echo "                   libldns support: $LDNS_MSG"
+ echo "  Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG"
diff -r df48148a4314 -r 8b6fe8133fb9 security/openssh/patches/patch-openbsd-compat_port-net.c
--- /dev/null   Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000
+++ b/security/openssh/patches/patch-openbsd-compat_port-net.c  Sun May 15 19:21:55 2022 +0000
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+$NetBSD: patch-openbsd-compat_port-net.c,v 1.1 2022/05/15 19:21:56 wiz Exp $
+
+if_tun.h can be found in net/tun
+
+--- openbsd-compat/port-net.c.orig     2020-09-27 07:25:01.000000000 +0000
++++ openbsd-compat/port-net.c
+@@ -135,6 +135,10 @@ sys_set_process_rdomain(const char *name
+  * System-specific tunnel open function
+  */
+ 
++#ifdef HAVE_NET_TUN_IF_TUN_H
++#include <net/tun/if_tun.h>
++#endif
++
+ #if defined(SSH_TUN_LINUX)
+ #include <linux/if_tun.h>
+ #define TUN_CTRL_DEV "/dev/net/tun"
diff -r df48148a4314 -r 8b6fe8133fb9 security/openssh/patches/patch-openbsd-compat_port-tun.c
--- a/security/openssh/patches/patch-openbsd-compat_port-tun.c  Sun May 15 19:12:24 2022 +0000
+++ /dev/null   Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000
@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
-$NetBSD: patch-openbsd-compat_port-tun.c,v 1.5 2020/09/29 15:17:42 ryoon Exp $
-
-if_tun.h can be found in net/tun
-
---- openbsd-compat/port-net.c.orig     2020-09-27 07:25:01.000000000 +0000
-+++ openbsd-compat/port-net.c
-@@ -135,6 +135,10 @@ sys_set_process_rdomain(const char *name
-  * System-specific tunnel open function
-  */
- 
-+#ifdef HAVE_NET_TUN_IF_TUN_H
-+#include <net/tun/if_tun.h>
-+#endif
-+
- #if defined(SSH_TUN_LINUX)
- #include <linux/if_tun.h>
- #define TUN_CTRL_DEV "/dev/net/tun"