CVS commit: pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel45

["Manuel Bouyer" <bouyer%netbsd.org@localhost>]

Module Name:    pkgsrc
Committed By:   bouyer
Date:           Wed Dec 21 15:36:08 UTC 2016

Modified Files:
        pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel45: Makefile distinfo
Added Files:
        pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel45/patches: patch-XSA-202

Log Message:
Apply patch from upstream, fixing XSA-202


To generate a diff of this commit:
cvs rdiff -u -r1.25 -r1.26 pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel45/Makefile
cvs rdiff -u -r1.20 -r1.21 pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel45/distinfo
cvs rdiff -u -r0 -r1.1 pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel45/patches/patch-XSA-202

Please note that diffs are not public domain; they are subject to the
copyright notices on the relevant files.

Modified files:

Index: pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel45/Makefile
diff -u pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel45/Makefile:1.25 pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel45/Makefile:1.26
--- pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel45/Makefile:1.25   Tue Dec 20 18:15:09 2016
+++ pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel45/Makefile        Wed Dec 21 15:36:08 2016
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
-# $NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.25 2016/12/20 18:15:09 gdt Exp $
+# $NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.26 2016/12/21 15:36:08 bouyer Exp $
 
 VERSION=       4.5.5
 DISTNAME=      xen-${VERSION}
 PKGNAME=       xenkernel45-${VERSION}
-PKGREVISION=   2
+PKGREVISION=   3
 CATEGORIES=    sysutils
 MASTER_SITES=  http://bits.xensource.com/oss-xen/release/${VERSION}/
 

Index: pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel45/distinfo
diff -u pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel45/distinfo:1.20 pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel45/distinfo:1.21
--- pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel45/distinfo:1.20   Tue Dec 20 10:22:28 2016
+++ pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel45/distinfo        Wed Dec 21 15:36:08 2016
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-$NetBSD: distinfo,v 1.20 2016/12/20 10:22:28 bouyer Exp $
+$NetBSD: distinfo,v 1.21 2016/12/21 15:36:08 bouyer Exp $
 
 SHA1 (xen-4.5.5.tar.gz) = 4073d411c72d3298baacfc15577b92b9ae577073
 RMD160 (xen-4.5.5.tar.gz) = 34132ab04752dc594fbdc1404c95f402b7bbbe39
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ SHA1 (patch-XSA-195) = 0a44b7deda6a17c88
 SHA1 (patch-XSA-196-1) = bdcd7673443fbf59aeff8ad019ffbe39758fcaee
 SHA1 (patch-XSA-196-2) = 81b1d46f3ec8a3c5133f6a923fee0ab1b2b1c6a0
 SHA1 (patch-XSA-200) = 37254653e3f9016de0440047465fddce7e9b1874
+SHA1 (patch-XSA-202) = 52cb1da3bb078f6b7574f606b8c9cacdf24f6518
 SHA1 (patch-XSA-204) = 4d5616f418e3ea010af4cb9e5d1ad14c8adcbf1c
 SHA1 (patch-xen_Makefile) = 750d0c8d4fea14d3ef3f872de5242a1f5104cbbe
 SHA1 (patch-xen_arch_x86_Rules.mk) = 7b0894ba7311edb02118a021671f304cf3872154

Added files:

Index: pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel45/patches/patch-XSA-202
diff -u /dev/null pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel45/patches/patch-XSA-202:1.1
--- /dev/null   Wed Dec 21 15:36:08 2016
+++ pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel45/patches/patch-XSA-202   Wed Dec 21 15:36:08 2016
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+$NetBSD: patch-XSA-202,v 1.1 2016/12/21 15:36:08 bouyer Exp $
+
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich%suse.com@localhost>
+Subject: x86: force EFLAGS.IF on when exiting to PV guests
+
+Guest kernels modifying instructions in the process of being emulated
+for another of their vCPU-s may effect EFLAGS.IF to be cleared upon
+next exiting to guest context, by converting the being emulated
+instruction to CLI (at the right point in time). Prevent any such bad
+effects by always forcing EFLAGS.IF on. And to cover hypothetical other
+similar issues, also force EFLAGS.{IOPL,NT,VM} to zero.
+
+This is XSA-202.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich%suse.com@localhost>
+
+--- xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S.orig
++++ xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S
+@@ -174,6 +174,8 @@ compat_bad_hypercall:
+ /* %rbx: struct vcpu, interrupts disabled */
+ ENTRY(compat_restore_all_guest)
+         ASSERT_INTERRUPTS_DISABLED
++        mov   $~(X86_EFLAGS_IOPL|X86_EFLAGS_NT|X86_EFLAGS_VM),%r11d
++        and   UREGS_eflags(%rsp),%r11d
+ .Lcr4_orig:
+         .skip .Lcr4_alt_end - .Lcr4_alt, 0x90
+ .Lcr4_orig_end:
+@@ -209,6 +211,8 @@ ENTRY(compat_restore_all_guest)
+                              (.Lcr4_orig_end - .Lcr4_orig), \
+                              (.Lcr4_alt_end - .Lcr4_alt)
+         .popsection
++        or    $X86_EFLAGS_IF,%r11
++        mov   %r11d,UREGS_eflags(%rsp)
+         RESTORE_ALL adj=8 compat=1
+ .Lft0:  iretq
+ 
+--- xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S.orig
++++ xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S
+@@ -40,28 +40,29 @@ restore_all_guest:
+         testw $TRAP_syscall,4(%rsp)
+         jz    iret_exit_to_guest
+ 
++        movq  24(%rsp),%r11           # RFLAGS
++        andq  $~(X86_EFLAGS_IOPL|X86_EFLAGS_NT|X86_EFLAGS_VM),%r11
++        orq   $X86_EFLAGS_IF,%r11
++
+         /* Don't use SYSRET path if the return address is not canonical. */
+         movq  8(%rsp),%rcx
+         sarq  $47,%rcx
+         incl  %ecx
+         cmpl  $1,%ecx
+-        ja    .Lforce_iret
++        movq  8(%rsp),%rcx            # RIP
++        ja    iret_exit_to_guest
+ 
+         cmpw  $FLAT_USER_CS32,16(%rsp)# CS
+-        movq  8(%rsp),%rcx            # RIP
+-        movq  24(%rsp),%r11           # RFLAGS
+         movq  32(%rsp),%rsp           # RSP
+         je    1f
+         sysretq
+ 1:      sysretl
+ 
+-.Lforce_iret:
+-        /* Mimic SYSRET behavior. */
+-        movq  8(%rsp),%rcx            # RIP
+-        movq  24(%rsp),%r11           # RFLAGS
+         ALIGN
+ /* No special register assumptions. */
+ iret_exit_to_guest:
++        andl  $~(X86_EFLAGS_IOPL|X86_EFLAGS_NT|X86_EFLAGS_VM),24(%rsp)
++        orl   $X86_EFLAGS_IF,24(%rsp)
+         addq  $8,%rsp
+ .Lft0:  iretq
+