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/dev/random often empty
I have a netbsd-4 xen2 domU (on xen2 dom0), and /dev/random is usually
nearly emtpy:
$ rndctl -s
860227 bits mixed into pool
64 bits currently stored in pool (max 4096)
781210 bits of entropy discarded due to full pool
78953 hard-random bits generated
9344583 pseudo-random bits generated
All of the bits (except for 9 mysterious ones) have come from xbd0:
$ rndctl -l
Source Bits Type Flags
xbd0 860218 disk estimate, collect
xennet0 0 net
I noticed this because on login I run coda's clog, and it apparently
wants 16 bytes from /dev/random. (Coda uses a variant of
Needham-Shroeder for authentication.)
In roughly the same uptime (4+ days), a real machine that's used more
has:
rndctl -s
9968879 bits mixed into pool
0 bits currently stored in pool (max 4096)
6538249 bits of entropy discarded due to full pool
3430630 hard-random bits generated
403079498 pseudo-random bits generated
Source Bits Type Flags
ums1 151156 tty estimate, collect
ums0 64 tty estimate, collect
ukbd0 146554 tty estimate, collect
wd0 8089071 disk estimate, collect
st0 1579712 tape estimate, collect
pckbd0 2304 tty estimate, collect
So, fairly clearly domU is an entropy-poor environment. But servers
need random bits. Does anyone have thoughts about how to deal with
this? Should there be a xen random source pseudodevice providing bits
from dom0?
Also, I wanted to understand how entropy was used; it seems it's
always used up and I know of know way to know what the consumers
were. I suspect it's a combination of sshd and racoon (I use
transport-mode IPsec on coda traffic).
Is there any reason not to bump up the pool size? I'm not sure it
would help that much; I suspect lots of bits are generated during
backups and the 'discarded' counter only goes up then.
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