Hi,
> > It could be another subfield in gecos in /etc/password, or a
> > mod 644 ${HOME}/.writefmt file.
>
> Both options are completely in the user's control and absolutely safe
> from a security point of view. (If there are security concerns with
> invalid format strings being passed to strftime(3), that's a bigger
> problem.)
>
> I don't need to explain to you that dot files in one's home directory
> are a common way to control behavior. For an example of expressing a
> preference to a process not owned by the user, I refer you
> to .forward, a file so old it predates history, if the manual be our
> guide.
>
> Agreed, the complexity might not be worth it, fsvo of "it". But the
> OP's proposal was more complex, requiring agreement between sender
> and recipient. By using ~/.writefmt instead, write locates the user,
> attempts to open one file in his home directory and, if successful,
> uses the contained string to format the time. Fallback is current
> behavior. It's small, safe, predictable, and convenient.
so you want write(1) or group tty resp. to have even more permissions than
currently. And to fail when network is down because of nfs (home) hanging,
ldap hanging, or whatever.
There is no solution for this issue except for what I proposed. Everything
else involves technical complexity, defeating one of write's great pros.
An agreement between sender and recipient is not complex. For those who are
affected by my change, there's an agreement between sender and receiver
anyway about the terminal being used for communication and the terminal
staying open.
Regards, Julian
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