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On Sun, Apr 18, 2004 at 03:35:23AM -0400, Thor Lancelot Simon wrote:
> On Sun, Apr 18, 2004 at 01:55:27PM +0900, Curt Sampson wrote:
> >=20
> > If you're go all the way with this, even that might not be good enough.
> > What is there to stop someone from making the password hash of a poor
> > pasword on another machine and using vipw to set it?
>=20
> Precisely that crypt(3) sees the *input* to the hash, and can enforce
> arbitrary restrictions on it.

As does login (etc) at the time the passwd is used, which is Curt's
point.  I'm not entirely sure I like the idea, but the point is valid.

--
Dan.

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