Subject: Re: kern/1967: securelevel should be patchable
To: Charles M. Hannum <mycroft@NetBSD.ORG>
From: James da Silva <jds@cs.umd.edu>
List: netbsd-bugs
Date: 01/30/1996 14:56:04
> Ah. It follows then that _every_ binary and script run in single
> user mode must be immutable, or there's little point to having
> securelevel 1.
>
> That's correct. Although I suspect we don't want to make it the
> default, someone should identify all of the naughty bits and create
> some convenient way for a user to configure their box to be `secure'
> if they so desire.
Wait, there's more, I think:
There's potentially a big lag between when inetd is started and when
securelevel 1 is set. Isn't this a window big enough to drive a truck
through? Extrapolate to taste for other daemons that get started in single
user mode and take input from the net (eg mountd/nfsd).
No amount of immutable bits will save us from this one - these daemons
can't become active until securelevel is set to 1.
Gack, again.
I wonder if anyone has done the full analysis of what is required to set up
a "secure" "securelevel 1" site? The designers of the securelevel feature,
presumably, but did they publish?
Until such a thing is done maybe the thing to do is just turn off the
feature by default, lest it give someone a false fuzzy feeling.
IMO.
Jaime
..............................................................................
: James da Silva : UMCP Computer Science Dept : Stand on my shoulders, :
: jds@cs.umd.edu : http://www.cs.umd.edu/~jds : not on my toes. :