Subject: re: security/10206
To: None <security-officer@netbsd.org, gnats-admin@netbsd.org,>
From: Elad Efrat <elad@NetBSD.org>
List: netbsd-bugs
Date: 08/15/2005 18:10:03
The following reply was made to PR bin/10206; it has been noted by GNATS.
From: Elad Efrat <elad@NetBSD.org>
To: david@NetBSD.org
Cc: gnats-bugs@netbsd.org
Subject: re: security/10206
Date: Mon, 15 Aug 2005 21:00:03 +0300
David,
There are also plenty of PRs about system integrity, and we don't enable
Veriexec by default. The way I see it, NetBSD should provide the tools
for an admin to customize the security of her system the way she sees
fit.
This whole PR is based on the assumption that we are not doing anything
to prevent brute-force password cracking.
How many guesses does it take to pick a password? Should we be enforcing
this for *all* users, even those who use NetBSD in environments where
these concerns no longer hold?
Unless you are taking measures to prevent an attacker from infinitely
trying all password combinations, your password *will* be cracked. This
is why many people use public keys, and why many admins care about
rate-limiting login attempts; *this* is where we should aim if we want
to have a take on solving this problem.
IMHO, enforcing 10-char, upper/lower/digit/punctuation passwords is
archaic. And given JtR allows you to specify possible password patterns,
and the power of today's computers, and the ability to no transparent
processing distribution, I don't see how any of the suggested in this
patch solves the problem.
-e.
--
Elad Efrat
PGP Key ID: 0x666EB914