Re: pthread_setaffinity_np() permissions / secmodel sysctl(7)s

[Jean-Yves Migeon <jeanyves.migeon%free.fr@localhost>]

On Fri, 04 Nov 2011 01:39:45 +0100, Jean-Yves Migeon wrote:
> (CCing tech-kern)
>
> On 03.11.2011 10:38, Jean-Yves Migeon wrote:
> > On Wed, 2 Nov 2011 22:36:58 -0400, Thor Lancelot Simon wrote:
> > > On Thu, Nov 03, 2011 at 03:30:54AM +0100, Jean-Yves Migeon wrote:
> > > > Should not? I took the same logic as the one allowing usermounts.
> > > > It's a matter of policy though.
> > >
> > > None of the security sysctls should be changeable at securelevel 1 
> > > or
> > > higher. Certainly it should not be possible to grant additional
> > > privileges
> > > to non-root users. Is there logic somewhere else preventing it, 
> > > like
> > > in the relevant kauth listener perhaps?
> >
> > None, the checks are simply not implemented in 
> > secmodel_securelevel(9).
> > I'll have a look this evening.
> >
> > This has to be done for each variable though depending on their use: 
> > in
> > usermount/usersetaffinity cases, it's reasonable to deny additional
> > rights to non-root users, but turning off these rights should still 
> > be
> > permitted even when securelevel is set to 1+.
>
> I hit an interesting scenario here -- an interdependency problem
> between secmodel modules.

FWIW I received a private reply from Elad with an API proposal (not yet 
implemented, so I'll look into it).

--
Jean-Yves Migeon
jeanyves.migeon%free.fr@localhost

--
Jean-Yves Migeon
jeanyves.migeon%free.fr@localhost