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[src/trunk]: src/sys/arch/x86/x86 Reorder and rename, to make the code less S...
details: https://anonhg.NetBSD.org/src/rev/a3707411975d
branches: trunk
changeset: 832651:a3707411975d
user: maxv <maxv%NetBSD.org@localhost>
date: Tue May 22 06:31:05 2018 +0000
description:
Reorder and rename, to make the code less SpectreV2-specific.
diffstat:
sys/arch/x86/x86/spectre.c | 160 +++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
sys/arch/x86/x86/x86_machdep.c | 12 +-
2 files changed, 89 insertions(+), 83 deletions(-)
diffs (truncated from 350 to 300 lines):
diff -r 42f36a9a27ed -r a3707411975d sys/arch/x86/x86/spectre.c
--- a/sys/arch/x86/x86/spectre.c Tue May 22 05:39:44 2018 +0000
+++ b/sys/arch/x86/x86/spectre.c Tue May 22 06:31:05 2018 +0000
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $NetBSD: spectre.c,v 1.10 2018/04/05 15:04:29 maxv Exp $ */
+/* $NetBSD: spectre.c,v 1.11 2018/05/22 06:31:05 maxv Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2018 NetBSD Foundation, Inc.
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
*/
#include <sys/cdefs.h>
-__KERNEL_RCSID(0, "$NetBSD: spectre.c,v 1.10 2018/04/05 15:04:29 maxv Exp $");
+__KERNEL_RCSID(0, "$NetBSD: spectre.c,v 1.11 2018/05/22 06:31:05 maxv Exp $");
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/systm.h>
@@ -55,44 +55,19 @@
MITIGATION_INTEL_IBRS
};
-bool spec_mitigation_enabled __read_mostly = false;
-static enum spec_mitigation mitigation_method = MITIGATION_NONE;
-char spec_mitigation_name[64] = "(none)";
-
-void speculation_barrier(struct lwp *, struct lwp *);
-
-void
-speculation_barrier(struct lwp *oldlwp, struct lwp *newlwp)
-{
- if (!spec_mitigation_enabled)
- return;
-
- /*
- * From kernel thread to kernel thread, no need for a barrier.
- */
- if ((oldlwp != NULL && (oldlwp->l_flag & LW_SYSTEM)) &&
- (newlwp->l_flag & LW_SYSTEM))
- return;
-
- switch (mitigation_method) {
- case MITIGATION_INTEL_IBRS:
- wrmsr(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, IA32_PRED_CMD_IBPB);
- break;
- default:
- /* nothing */
- break;
- }
-}
+bool spec_v2_mitigation_enabled __read_mostly = false;
+static enum spec_mitigation mitigation_v2_method = MITIGATION_NONE;
+char spec_v2_mitigation_name[64] = "(none)";
static void
-speculation_set_name(void)
+spec_v2_set_name(void)
{
const char *name;
- if (!spec_mitigation_enabled) {
+ if (!spec_v2_mitigation_enabled) {
name = "(none)";
} else {
- switch (mitigation_method) {
+ switch (mitigation_v2_method) {
case MITIGATION_AMD_DIS_IND:
name = "AMD DIS_IND";
break;
@@ -103,12 +78,12 @@
panic("%s: impossible", __func__);
}
}
- strlcpy(spec_mitigation_name, name,
- sizeof(spec_mitigation_name));
+ strlcpy(spec_v2_mitigation_name, name,
+ sizeof(spec_v2_mitigation_name));
}
static void
-speculation_detect_method(void)
+spec_v2_detect_method(void)
{
struct cpu_info *ci = curcpu();
u_int descs[4];
@@ -119,15 +94,15 @@
if (descs[3] & CPUID_SEF_IBRS) {
/* descs[3] = %edx */
#ifdef __x86_64__
- mitigation_method = MITIGATION_INTEL_IBRS;
+ mitigation_v2_method = MITIGATION_INTEL_IBRS;
#else
/* IBRS not supported on i386. */
- mitigation_method = MITIGATION_NONE;
+ mitigation_v2_method = MITIGATION_NONE;
#endif
return;
}
}
- mitigation_method = MITIGATION_NONE;
+ mitigation_v2_method = MITIGATION_NONE;
} else if (cpu_vendor == CPUVENDOR_AMD) {
/*
* The AMD Family 10h manual documents the IC_CFG.DIS_IND bit.
@@ -140,14 +115,14 @@
case 0x10:
case 0x12:
case 0x16:
- mitigation_method = MITIGATION_AMD_DIS_IND;
+ mitigation_v2_method = MITIGATION_AMD_DIS_IND;
break;
default:
- mitigation_method = MITIGATION_NONE;
+ mitigation_v2_method = MITIGATION_NONE;
break;
}
} else {
- mitigation_method = MITIGATION_NONE;
+ mitigation_v2_method = MITIGATION_NONE;
}
}
@@ -217,11 +192,11 @@
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
static void
-mitigation_apply_cpu(struct cpu_info *ci, bool enabled)
+mitigation_v2_apply_cpu(struct cpu_info *ci, bool enabled)
{
uint64_t msr;
- switch (mitigation_method) {
+ switch (mitigation_v2_method) {
case MITIGATION_NONE:
panic("impossible");
case MITIGATION_INTEL_IBRS:
@@ -253,14 +228,14 @@
* Note: IBRS requires hotpatching, so we need barriers.
*/
static void
-mitigation_change_cpu(void *arg1, void *arg2)
+mitigation_v2_change_cpu(void *arg1, void *arg2)
{
struct cpu_info *ci = curcpu();
bool enabled = (bool)arg1;
u_long psl = 0;
/* Rendez-vous 1 (IBRS only). */
- if (mitigation_method == MITIGATION_INTEL_IBRS) {
+ if (mitigation_v2_method == MITIGATION_INTEL_IBRS) {
psl = x86_read_psl();
x86_disable_intr();
@@ -270,10 +245,10 @@
}
}
- mitigation_apply_cpu(ci, enabled);
+ mitigation_v2_apply_cpu(ci, enabled);
/* Rendez-vous 2 (IBRS only). */
- if (mitigation_method == MITIGATION_INTEL_IBRS) {
+ if (mitigation_v2_method == MITIGATION_INTEL_IBRS) {
atomic_dec_ulong(&ibrs_cpu_barrier2);
while (atomic_cas_ulong(&ibrs_cpu_barrier2, 0, 0) != 0) {
x86_pause();
@@ -288,13 +263,13 @@
}
static int
-mitigation_change(bool enabled)
+mitigation_v2_change(bool enabled)
{
struct cpu_info *ci = NULL;
CPU_INFO_ITERATOR cii;
uint64_t xc;
- speculation_detect_method();
+ spec_v2_detect_method();
mutex_enter(&cpu_lock);
@@ -311,7 +286,7 @@
}
}
- switch (mitigation_method) {
+ switch (mitigation_v2_method) {
case MITIGATION_NONE:
printf("[!] No mitigation available\n");
mutex_exit(&cpu_lock);
@@ -324,38 +299,19 @@
printf("[+] %s SpectreV2 Mitigation...",
enabled ? "Enabling" : "Disabling");
- xc = xc_broadcast(0, mitigation_change_cpu,
+ xc = xc_broadcast(0, mitigation_v2_change_cpu,
(void *)enabled, NULL);
xc_wait(xc);
printf(" done!\n");
- spec_mitigation_enabled = enabled;
+ spec_v2_mitigation_enabled = enabled;
mutex_exit(&cpu_lock);
- speculation_set_name();
+ spec_v2_set_name();
return 0;
default:
panic("impossible");
}
}
-void
-cpu_speculation_init(struct cpu_info *ci)
-{
- /*
- * cpu0 is the one that detects the method and sets the global
- * variable.
- */
- if (ci == &cpu_info_primary) {
- speculation_detect_method();
- spec_mitigation_enabled =
- (mitigation_method != MITIGATION_NONE);
- speculation_set_name();
- }
-
- if (mitigation_method != MITIGATION_NONE) {
- mitigation_apply_cpu(ci, true);
- }
-}
-
int sysctl_machdep_spectreV2_mitigated(SYSCTLFN_ARGS);
int
@@ -375,16 +331,66 @@
return error;
if (val == 0) {
- if (!spec_mitigation_enabled)
+ if (!spec_v2_mitigation_enabled)
error = 0;
else
- error = mitigation_change(false);
+ error = mitigation_v2_change(false);
} else {
- if (spec_mitigation_enabled)
+ if (spec_v2_mitigation_enabled)
error = 0;
else
- error = mitigation_change(true);
+ error = mitigation_v2_change(true);
}
return error;
}
+
+/* -------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+void speculation_barrier(struct lwp *, struct lwp *);
+
+void
+speculation_barrier(struct lwp *oldlwp, struct lwp *newlwp)
+{
+ /*
+ * Speculation barriers are applicable only to Spectre V2.
+ */
+ if (!spec_v2_mitigation_enabled)
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * From kernel thread to kernel thread, no need for a barrier.
+ */
+ if ((oldlwp != NULL && (oldlwp->l_flag & LW_SYSTEM)) &&
+ (newlwp->l_flag & LW_SYSTEM))
+ return;
+
+ switch (mitigation_v2_method) {
+ case MITIGATION_INTEL_IBRS:
+ wrmsr(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, IA32_PRED_CMD_IBPB);
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* nothing */
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
+void
+cpu_speculation_init(struct cpu_info *ci)
+{
+ /*
+ * Spectre V2.
+ *
+ * cpu0 is the one that detects the method and sets the global
+ * variable.
+ */
+ if (ci == &cpu_info_primary) {
+ spec_v2_detect_method();
+ spec_v2_mitigation_enabled =
+ (mitigation_v2_method != MITIGATION_NONE);
+ spec_v2_set_name();
+ }
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