[pkgsrc/trunk]: pkgsrc/security/openssh Update to OpenSSH 8.3

[sevan <sevan%pkgsrc.org@localhost>]

details:   https://anonhg.NetBSD.org/pkgsrc/rev/6ccb56286e9a
branches:  trunk
changeset: 432932:6ccb56286e9a
user:      sevan <sevan%pkgsrc.org@localhost>
date:      Wed May 27 13:49:27 2020 +0000

description:
Update to OpenSSH 8.3

OpenSSH 8.3 was released on 2020-05-27. It is available from the
mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/.

OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and
includes sftp client and server support.

Once again, we would like to thank the OpenSSH community for their
continued support of the project, especially those who contributed
code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the
project. More information on donations may be found at:
https://www.openssh.com/donations.html

Future deprecation notice
=========================

It is now possible[1] to perform chosen-prefix attacks against the
SHA-1 algorithm for less than USD$50K. For this reason, we will be
disabling the "ssh-rsa" public key signature algorithm by default in a
near-future release.

This algorithm is unfortunately still used widely despite the
existence of better alternatives, being the only remaining public key
signature algorithm specified by the original SSH RFCs.

The better alternatives include:

 * The RFC8332 RSA SHA-2 signature algorithms rsa-sha2-256/512. These
   algorithms have the advantage of using the same key type as
   "ssh-rsa" but use the safe SHA-2 hash algorithms. These have been
   supported since OpenSSH 7.2 and are already used by default if the
   client and server support them.

 * The ssh-ed25519 signature algorithm. It has been supported in
   OpenSSH since release 6.5.

 * The RFC5656 ECDSA algorithms: ecdsa-sha2-nistp256/384/521. These
   have been supported by OpenSSH since release 5.7.

To check whether a server is using the weak ssh-rsa public key
algorithm, for host authentication, try to connect to it after
removing the ssh-rsa algorithm from ssh(1)'s allowed list:

    ssh -oHostKeyAlgorithms=-ssh-rsa user@host

If the host key verification fails and no other supported host key
types are available, the server software on that host should be
upgraded.

A future release of OpenSSH will enable UpdateHostKeys by default
to allow the client to automatically migrate to better algorithms.
Users may consider enabling this option manually. Vendors of devices
that implement the SSH protocol should ensure that they support the
new signature algorithms for RSA keys.

[1] "SHA-1 is a Shambles: First Chosen-Prefix Collision on SHA-1 and
    Application to the PGP Web of Trust" Leurent, G and Peyrin, T
    (2020) https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/014.pdf

Security
========

 * scp(1): when receiving files, scp(1) could be become desynchronised
   if a utimes(2) system call failed. This could allow file contents
   to be interpreted as file metadata and thereby permit an adversary
   to craft a file system that, when copied with scp(1) in a
   configuration that caused utimes(2) to fail (e.g. under a SELinux
   policy or syscall sandbox), transferred different file names and
   contents to the actual file system layout.

   Exploitation of this is not likely as utimes(2) does not fail under
   normal circumstances. Successful exploitation is not silent - the
   output of scp(1) would show transfer errors followed by the actual
   file(s) that were received.

   Finally, filenames returned from the peer are (since openssh-8.0)
   matched against the user's requested destination, thereby
   disallowing a successful exploit from writing files outside the
   user's selected target glob (or directory, in the case of a
   recursive transfer). This ensures that this attack can achieve no
   more than a hostile peer is already able to achieve within the scp
   protocol.

Potentially-incompatible changes
================================

This release includes a number of changes that may affect existing
configurations:

 * sftp(1): reject an argument of "-1" in the same way as ssh(1) and
   scp(1) do instead of accepting and silently ignoring it.

Changes since OpenSSH 8.2
=========================

The focus of this release is bug fixing.

New Features
------------

 * sshd(8): make IgnoreRhosts a tri-state option: "yes" to ignore
   rhosts/shosts, "no" allow rhosts/shosts or (new) "shosts-only"
   to allow .shosts files but not .rhosts.

 * sshd(8): allow the IgnoreRhosts directive to appear anywhere in a
   sshd_config, not just before any Match blocks; bz3148

 * ssh(1): add %TOKEN percent expansion for the LocalFoward and
   RemoteForward keywords when used for Unix domain socket forwarding.
   bz#3014

 * all: allow loading public keys from the unencrypted envelope of a
   private key file if no corresponding public key file is present.

 * ssh(1), sshd(8): prefer to use chacha20 from libcrypto where
   possible instead of the (slower) portable C implementation included
   in OpenSSH.

 * ssh-keygen(1): add ability to dump the contents of a binary key
   revocation list via "ssh-keygen -lQf /path" bz#3132

Bugfixes
--------

 * ssh(1): fix IdentitiesOnly=yes to also apply to keys loaded from
   a PKCS11Provider; bz#3141

 * ssh-keygen(1): avoid NULL dereference when trying to convert an
   invalid RFC4716 private key.

 * scp(1): when performing remote-to-remote copies using "scp -3",
   start the second ssh(1) channel with BatchMode=yes enabled to
   avoid confusing and non-deterministic ordering of prompts.

 * ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1): when signing a challenge using a FIDO token,
   perform hashing of the message to be signed in the middleware layer
   rather than in OpenSSH code. This permits the use of security key
   middlewares that perform the hashing implicitly, such as Windows
   Hello.

 * ssh(1): fix incorrect error message for "too many known hosts
   files." bz#3149

 * ssh(1): make failures when establishing "Tunnel" forwarding
   terminate the connection when ExitOnForwardFailure is enabled;
   bz#3116

 * ssh-keygen(1): fix printing of fingerprints on private keys and add
   a regression test for same.

 * sshd(8): document order of checking AuthorizedKeysFile (first) and
   AuthorizedKeysCommand (subsequently, if the file doesn't match);
   bz#3134

 * sshd(8): document that /etc/hosts.equiv and /etc/shosts.equiv are
   not considered for HostbasedAuthentication when the target user is
   root; bz#3148

 * ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1): fix NULL dereference in private certificate
   key parsing (oss-fuzz #20074).

 * ssh(1), sshd(8): more consistency between sets of %TOKENS are
   accepted in various configuration options.

 * ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1): improve error messages for some common
   PKCS#11 C_Login failure cases; bz#3130

 * ssh(1), sshd(8): make error messages for problems during SSH banner
   exchange consistent with other SSH transport-layer error messages
   and ensure they include the relevant IP addresses bz#3129

 * various: fix a number of spelling errors in comments and debug/error
   messages

 * ssh-keygen(1), ssh-add(1): when downloading FIDO2 resident keys
   from a token, don't prompt for a PIN until the token has told us
   that it needs one. Avoids double-prompting on devices that
   implement on-device authentication.

 * sshd(8), ssh-keygen(1): no-touch-required FIDO certificate option
   should be an extension, not a critical option.

 * ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1), ssh-add(1): offer a better error message
   when trying to use a FIDO key function and SecurityKeyProvider is
   empty.

 * ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(8): ensure that a key lifetime fits within
   the values allowed by the wire format (u32). Prevents integer
   wraparound of the timeout values. bz#3119

 * ssh(1): detect and prevent trivial configuration loops when using
    ProxyJump. bz#3057.

Portability
-----------

 * Detect systems where signals flagged with SA_RESTART will interrupt
   select(2). POSIX permits implementations to choose whether
   select(2) will return when interrupted with a SA_RESTART-flagged
   signal, but OpenSSH requires interrupting behaviour.

 * Several compilation fixes for HP/UX and AIX.

 * On platforms that do not support setting process-wide routing
   domains (all excepting OpenBSD at present), fail to accept a
   configuration attempts to set one at process start time rather than
   fatally erroring at run time. bz#3126

 * Improve detection of egrep (used in regression tests) on platforms
   that offer a poor default one (e.g. Solaris).

 * A number of shell portability fixes for the regression tests.

 * Fix theoretical infinite loop in the glob(3) replacement
   implementation.

 * Fix seccomp sandbox compilation problems for some Linux
   configurations bz#3085

 * Improved detection of libfido2 and some compilation fixes for some
   configurations when --with-security-key-builtin is selected.

OpenSSH 8.2 was released on 2020-02-14. It is available from the
mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/.

OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and
includes sftp client and server support.

Once again, we would like to thank the OpenSSH community for their
continued support of the project, especially those who contributed
code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the
project. More information on donations may be found at:
https://www.openssh.com/donations.html

Future deprecation notice
=========================

It is now possible[1] to perform chosen-prefix attacks against the
SHA-1 hash algorithm for less than USD$50K. For this reason, we will
be disabling the "ssh-rsa" public key signature algorithm that depends
on SHA-1 by default in a near-future release.

This algorithm is unfortunately still used widely despite the
existence of better alternatives, being the only remaining public key
signature algorithm specified by the original SSH RFCs.

The better alternatives include:

 * The RFC8332 RSA SHA-2 signature algorithms rsa-sha2-256/512. These
   algorithms have the advantage of using the same key type as
   "ssh-rsa" but use the safe SHA-2 hash algorithms. These have been
   supported since OpenSSH 7.2 and are already used by default if the
   client and server support them.

 * The ssh-ed25519 signature algorithm. It has been supported in
   OpenSSH since release 6.5.

 * The RFC5656 ECDSA algorithms: ecdsa-sha2-nistp256/384/521. These
   have been supported by OpenSSH since release 5.7.

To check whether a server is using the weak ssh-rsa public key
algorithm for host authentication, try to connect to it after
removing the ssh-rsa algorithm from ssh(1)'s allowed list:

    ssh -oHostKeyAlgorithms=-ssh-rsa user@host

If the host key verification fails and no other supported host key
types are available, the server software on that host should be
upgraded.

A future release of OpenSSH will enable UpdateHostKeys by default
to allow the client to automatically migrate to better algorithms.
Users may consider enabling this option manually.

[1] "SHA-1 is a Shambles: First Chosen-Prefix Collision on SHA-1 and
    Application to the PGP Web of Trust" Leurent, G and Peyrin, T
    (2020) https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/014.pdf

Security
========

 * ssh(1), sshd(8), ssh-keygen(1): this release removes the "ssh-rsa"
   (RSA/SHA1) algorithm from those accepted for certificate signatures
   (i.e. the client and server CASignatureAlgorithms option) and will
   use the rsa-sha2-512 signature algorithm by default when the
   ssh-keygen(1) CA signs new certificates.

   Certificates are at special risk to the aforementioned SHA1
   collision vulnerability as an attacker has effectively unlimited
   time in which to craft a collision that yields them a valid
   certificate, far more than the relatively brief LoginGraceTime
   window that they have to forge a host key signature.

   The OpenSSH certificate format includes a CA-specified (typically
   random) nonce value near the start of the certificate that should
   make exploitation of chosen-prefix collisions in this context
   challenging, as the attacker does not have full control over the
   prefix that actually gets signed. Nonetheless, SHA1 is now a
   demonstrably broken algorithm and futher improvements in attacks
   are highly likely.

   OpenSSH releases prior to 7.2 do not support the newer RSA/SHA2
   algorithms and will refuse to accept certificates signed by an
   OpenSSH 8.2+ CA using RSA keys unless the unsafe algorithm is
   explicitly selected during signing ("ssh-keygen -t ssh-rsa").
   Older clients/servers may use another CA key type such as
   ssh-ed25519 (supported since OpenSSH 6.5) or one of the
   ecdsa-sha2-nistp256/384/521 types (supported since OpenSSH 5.7)
   instead if they cannot be upgraded.

Potentially-incompatible changes
================================

This release includes a number of changes that may affect existing
configurations:

 * ssh(1), sshd(8): the above removal of "ssh-rsa" from the accepted
   CASignatureAlgorithms list.

 * ssh(1), sshd(8): this release removes diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
   from the default key exchange proposal for both the client and
   server.

 * ssh-keygen(1): the command-line options related to the generation
   and screening of safe prime numbers used by the
   diffie-hellman-group-exchange-* key exchange algorithms have
   changed. Most options have been folded under the -O flag.

 * sshd(8): the sshd listener process title visible to ps(1) has
   changed to include information about the number of connections that
   are currently attempting authentication and the limits configured
   by MaxStartups.

 * ssh-sk-helper(8): this is a new binary. It is used by the FIDO/U2F
   support to provide address-space isolation for token middleware
   libraries (including the internal one). It needs to be installed
   in the expected path, typically under /usr/libexec or similar.

Changes since OpenSSH 8.1
=========================

This release contains some significant new features.

FIDO/U2F Support
----------------

This release adds support for FIDO/U2F hardware authenticators to
OpenSSH. U2F/FIDO are open standards for inexpensive two-factor
authentication hardware that are widely used for website
authentication.  In OpenSSH FIDO devices are supported by new public
key types "ecdsa-sk" and "ed25519-sk", along with corresponding
certificate types.

ssh-keygen(1) may be used to generate a FIDO token-backed key, after
which they may be used much like any other key type supported by
OpenSSH, so long as the hardware token is attached when the keys are
used. FIDO tokens also generally require the user explicitly authorise
operations by touching or tapping them.

Generating a FIDO key requires the token be attached, and will usually
require the user tap the token to confirm the operation:

  $ ssh-keygen -t ecdsa-sk -f ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk
  Generating public/private ecdsa-sk key pair.
  You may need to touch your security key to authorize key generation.
  Enter file in which to save the key (/home/djm/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk):
  Enter passphrase (empty for no passphrase):
  Enter same passphrase again:
  Your identification has been saved in /home/djm/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk
  Your public key has been saved in /home/djm/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk.pub

This will yield a public and private key-pair. The private key file
should be useless to an attacker who does not have access to the
physical token. After generation, this key may be used like any other
supported key in OpenSSH and may be listed in authorized_keys, added
to ssh-agent(1), etc. The only additional stipulation is that the FIDO
token that the key belongs to must be attached when the key is used.

FIDO tokens are most commonly connected via USB but may be attached
via other means such as Bluetooth or NFC. In OpenSSH, communication
with the token is managed via a middleware library, specified by the
SecurityKeyProvider directive in ssh/sshd_config(5) or the
$SSH_SK_PROVIDER environment variable for ssh-keygen(1) and
ssh-add(1). The API for this middleware is documented in the sk-api.h
and PROTOCOL.u2f files in the source distribution.

OpenSSH includes a middleware ("SecurityKeyProvider=internal") with
support for USB tokens. It is automatically enabled in OpenBSD and may
be enabled in portable OpenSSH via the configure flag
--with-security-key-builtin. If the internal middleware is enabled
then it is automatically used by default. This internal middleware
requires that libfido2 (https://github.com/Yubico/libfido2) and its
dependencies be installed. We recommend that packagers of portable
OpenSSH enable the built-in middleware, as it provides the
lowest-friction experience for users.

Note: FIDO/U2F tokens are required to implement the ECDSA-P256
"ecdsa-sk" key type, but hardware support for Ed25519 "ed25519-sk" is
less common. Similarly, not all hardware tokens support some of the
optional features such as resident keys.

The protocol-level changes to support FIDO/U2F keys in SSH are
documented in the PROTOCOL.u2f file in the OpenSSH source
distribution.

There are a number of supporting changes to this feature:

 * ssh-keygen(1): add a "no-touch-required" option when generating
   FIDO-hosted keys, that disables their default behaviour of
   requiring a physical touch/tap on the token during authentication.
   Note: not all tokens support disabling the touch requirement.

 * sshd(8): add a sshd_config PubkeyAuthOptions directive that
   collects miscellaneous public key authentication-related options
   for sshd(8). At present it supports only a single option
   "no-touch-required". This causes sshd to skip its default check for
   FIDO/U2F keys that the signature was authorised by a touch or press
   event on the token hardware.

 * ssh(1), sshd(8), ssh-keygen(1): add a "no-touch-required" option
   for authorized_keys and a similar extension for certificates. This
   option disables the default requirement that FIDO key signatures
   attest that the user touched their key to authorize them, mirroring
   the similar PubkeyAuthOptions sshd_config option.

 * ssh-keygen(1): add support for the writing the FIDO attestation
   information that is returned when new keys are generated via the
   "-O write-attestation=/path" option. FIDO attestation certificates
   may be used to verify that a FIDO key is hosted in trusted
   hardware. OpenSSH does not currently make use of this information,
   beyond optionally writing it to disk.

FIDO2 resident keys
-------------------

FIDO/U2F OpenSSH keys consist of two parts: a "key handle" part stored
in the private key file on disk, and a per-device private key that is
unique to each FIDO/U2F token and that cannot be exported from the
token hardware. These are combined by the hardware at authentication
time to derive the real key that is used to sign authentication
challenges.

For tokens that are required to move between computers, it can be
cumbersome to have to move the private key file first. To avoid this
requirement, tokens implementing the newer FIDO2 standard support
"resident keys", where it is possible to effectively retrieve the key
handle part of the key from the hardware.

OpenSSH supports this feature, allowing resident keys to be generated
using the ssh-keygen(1) "-O resident" flag. This will produce a
public/private key pair as usual, but it will be possible to retrieve
the private key part from the token later. This may be done using
"ssh-keygen -K", which will download all available resident keys from
the tokens attached to the host and write public/private key files
for them. It is also possible to download and add resident keys
directly to ssh-agent(1) without writing files to the file-system
using "ssh-add -K".

Resident keys are indexed on the token by the application string and
user ID. By default, OpenSSH uses an application string of "ssh:" and
an empty user ID. If multiple resident keys on a single token are
desired then it may be necessary to override one or both of these
defaults using the ssh-keygen(1) "-O application=" or "-O user="
options. Note: OpenSSH will only download and use resident keys whose
application string begins with "ssh:"

Storing both parts of a key on a FIDO token increases the likelihood
of an attacker being able to use a stolen token device. For this
reason, tokens should enforce PIN authentication before allowing
download of keys, and users should set a PIN on their tokens before
creating any resident keys.

Other New Features
------------------

 * sshd(8): add an Include sshd_config keyword that allows including
   additional configuration files via glob(3) patterns. bz2468

 * ssh(1)/sshd(8): make the LE (low effort) DSCP code point available
   via the IPQoS directive; bz2986,

 * ssh(1): when AddKeysToAgent=yes is set and the key contains no
   comment, add the key to the agent with the key's path as the
   comment. bz2564

 * ssh-keygen(1), ssh-agent(1): expose PKCS#11 key labels and X.509
   subjects as key comments, rather than simply listing the PKCS#11
   provider library path. PR138

 * ssh-keygen(1): allow PEM export of DSA and ECDSA keys; bz3091

 * ssh(1), sshd(8): make zlib compile-time optional, available via the
   Makefile.inc ZLIB flag on OpenBSD or via the --with-zlib configure
   option for OpenSSH portable.

 * sshd(8): when clients get denied by MaxStartups, send a
   notification prior to the SSH2 protocol banner according to
   RFC4253 section 4.2.

 * ssh(1), ssh-agent(1): when invoking the $SSH_ASKPASS prompt
   program, pass a hint to the program to describe the type of
   desired prompt.  The possible values are "confirm" (indicating
   that a yes/no confirmation dialog with no text entry should be
   shown), "none" (to indicate an informational message only), or
   blank for the original ssh-askpass behaviour of requesting a
   password/phrase.

 * ssh(1): allow forwarding a different agent socket to the path
   specified by $SSH_AUTH_SOCK, by extending the existing ForwardAgent
   option to accepting an explicit path or the name of an environment
   variable in addition to yes/no.

 * ssh-keygen(1): add a new signature operations "find-principals" to
   look up the principal associated with a signature from an allowed-
   signers file.

 * sshd(8): expose the number of currently-authenticating connections
   along with the MaxStartups limit in the process title visible to
   "ps".

Bugfixes
--------

 * sshd(8): make ClientAliveCountMax=0 have sensible semantics: it
   will now disable connection killing entirely rather than the
   current behaviour of instantly killing the connection after the
   first liveness test regardless of success. bz2627

 * sshd(8): clarify order of AllowUsers / DenyUsers vs AllowGroups /
   DenyGroups in the sshd(8) manual page. bz1690

 * sshd(8): better describe HashKnownHosts in the manual page. bz2560

 * sshd(8): clarify that that permitopen=/PermitOpen do no name or
   address translation in the manual page. bz3099

 * sshd(8): allow the UpdateHostKeys feature to function when
   multiple known_hosts files are in use. When updating host keys,
   ssh will now search subsequent known_hosts files, but will add
   updated host keys to the first specified file only. bz2738

 * All: replace all calls to signal(2) with a wrapper around
   sigaction(2). This wrapper blocks all other signals during the
   handler preventing races between handlers, and sets SA_RESTART
   which should reduce the potential for short read/write operations.

 * sftp(1): fix a race condition in the SIGCHILD handler that could
   turn in to a kill(-1); bz3084

 * sshd(8): fix a case where valid (but extremely large) SSH channel
   IDs were being incorrectly rejected. bz3098

 * ssh(1): when checking host key fingerprints as answers to new
   hostkey prompts, ignore whitespace surrounding the fingerprint
   itself.

 * All: wait for file descriptors to be readable or writeable during
   non-blocking connect, not just readable. Prevents a timeout when
   the server doesn't immediately send a banner (e.g. multiplexers
   like sslh)

 * sshd_config(5): document the sntrup4591761x25519-sha512%tinyssh.org@localhost
   key exchange algorithm. PR#151

Portability
-----------

 * sshd(8): multiple adjustments to the Linux seccomp sandbox:
   - Non-fatally deny IPC syscalls in sandbox
   - Allow clock_gettime64() in sandbox (MIPS / glibc >= 2.31)
   - Allow clock_nanosleep_time64 in sandbox (ARM) bz3100
   - Allow clock_nanosleep() in sandbox (recent glibc) bz3093

 * Explicit check for memmem declaration and fix up declaration if the
   system headers lack it. bz3102

OpenSSH 8.1 was released on 2019-10-09. It is available from the
mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/.

OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and
includes sftp client and server support.

Once again, we would like to thank the OpenSSH community for their
continued support of the project, especially those who contributed
code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the
project. More information on donations may be found at:
http://www.openssh.com/donations.html

Security
========

 * ssh(1), sshd(8), ssh-add(1), ssh-keygen(1): an exploitable integer
   overflow bug was found in the private key parsing code for the XMSS
   key type. This key type is still experimental and support for it is
   not compiled by default. No user-facing autoconf option exists in
   portable OpenSSH to enable it. This bug was found by Adam Zabrocki
   and reported via SecuriTeam's SSD program.

 * ssh(1), sshd(8), ssh-agent(1): add protection for private keys at
   rest in RAM against speculation and memory side-channel attacks like
   Spectre, Meltdown and Rambleed. This release encrypts private keys
   when they are not in use with a symmetric key that is derived from a
   relatively large "prekey" consisting of random data (currently 16KB).

Potentially-incompatible changes
================================

This release includes a number of changes that may affect existing
configurations:

 * ssh-keygen(1): when acting as a CA and signing certificates with
   an RSA key, default to using the rsa-sha2-512 signature algorithm.
   Certificates signed by RSA keys will therefore be incompatible
   with OpenSSH versions prior to 7.2 unless the default is
   overridden (using "ssh-keygen -t ssh-rsa -s ...").

Changes since OpenSSH 8.0
=========================

This release is focused on bug-fixing.

New Features
------------

 * ssh(1): Allow %n to be expanded in ProxyCommand strings

 * ssh(1), sshd(8): Allow prepending a list of algorithms to the
   default set by starting the list with the '^' character, E.g.
   "HostKeyAlgorithms ^ssh-ed25519"

 * ssh-keygen(1): add an experimental lightweight signature and
   verification ability. Signatures may be made using regular ssh keys
   held on disk or stored in a ssh-agent and verified against an
   authorized_keys-like list of allowed keys. Signatures embed a
   namespace that prevents confusion and attacks between different
   usage domains (e.g. files vs email).

 * ssh-keygen(1): print key comment when extracting public key from a
   private key.  bz#3052

 * ssh-keygen(1): accept the verbose flag when searching for host keys
   in known hosts (i.e. "ssh-keygen -vF host") to print the matching
   host's random-art signature too. bz#3003

 * All: support PKCS8 as an optional format for storage of private
   keys to disk.  The OpenSSH native key format remains the default,
   but PKCS8 is a superior format to PEM if interoperability with
   non-OpenSSH software is required, as it may use a less insecure
   key derivation function than PEM's.

Bugfixes
--------

 * ssh(1): if a PKCS#11 token returns no keys then try to login and
   refetch them. Based on patch from Jakub Jelen; bz#2430

 * ssh(1): produce a useful error message if the user's shell is set
   incorrectly during "match exec" processing. bz#2791

 * sftp(1): allow the maximum uint32 value for the argument passed
   to -b which allows better error messages from later validation.
   bz#3050

 * ssh(1): avoid pledge sandbox violations in some combinations of
   remote forwarding, connection multiplexing and ControlMaster.

 * ssh-keyscan(1): include SHA2-variant RSA key algorithms in KEX
   proposal; allows ssh-keyscan to harvest keys from servers that
   disable old SHA1 ssh-rsa. bz#3029

 * sftp(1): print explicit "not modified" message if a file was
   requested for resumed download but was considered already complete.
   bz#2978

 * sftp(1): fix a typo and make <esc><right> move right to the
   closest end of a word just like <esc><left> moves left to the
   closest beginning of a word.

 * sshd(8): cap the number of permitopen/permitlisten directives
   allowed to appear on a single authorized_keys line.

 * All: fix a number of memory leaks (one-off or on exit paths).

 * Regression tests: a number of fixes and improvements, including
   fixes to the interop tests, adding the ability to run most tests
   on builds that disable OpenSSL support, better support for running
   tests under Valgrind and a number of bug-fixes.

 * ssh(1), sshd(8): check for convtime() refusing to accept times that
   resolve to LONG_MAX Reported by Kirk Wolf bz2977

 * ssh(1): slightly more instructive error message when the user
   specifies multiple -J options on the command-line. bz3015

 * ssh-agent(1): process agent requests for RSA certificate private
   keys using correct signature algorithm when requested. bz3016

 * sftp(1): check for user@host when parsing sftp target. This
   allows user@[1.2.3.4] to work without a path.  bz#2999

 * sshd(8): enlarge format buffer size for certificate serial
   number so the log message can record any 64-bit integer without
   truncation. bz#3012

 * sshd(8): for PermitOpen violations add the remote host and port to
   be able to more easily ascertain the source of the request. Add the
   same logging for PermitListen violations which where not previously
   logged at all.

 * scp(1), sftp(1): use the correct POSIX format style for left
   justification for the transfer progress meter. bz#3002

 * sshd(8) when examining a configuration using sshd -T, assume any
   attribute not provided by -C does not match, which allows it to work
   when sshd_config contains a Match directive with or without -C.
   bz#2858

 * ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1): downgrade PKCS#11 "provider returned no
   slots" warning from log level error to debug. This is common when
   attempting to enumerate keys on smartcard readers with no cards
   plugged in. bz#3058

 * ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1): do not unconditionally log in to PKCS#11
   tokens. Avoids spurious PIN prompts for keys not selected for
   authentication in ssh(1) and when listing public keys available in
   a token using ssh-keygen(1). bz#3006

Portability
-----------

 * ssh(1): fix SIGWINCH delivery of Solaris for multiplexed sessions
   bz#3030

 * ssh(1), sshd(8): fix typo that prevented detection of Linux VRF

 * sshd(8): add no-op implementation of pam_putenv to avoid build
   breakage on platforms where the PAM implementation lacks this
   function (e.g. HP-UX). bz#3008

 * sftp-server(8): fix Solaris privilege sandbox from preventing
   the legacy sftp rename operation from working (was refusing to
   allow hard links to files owned by other users). bz#3036

 * All: add a proc_pidinfo()-based closefrom() for OS X to avoid
   the need to brute-force close all high-numbered file descriptors.
   bz#3049

 * sshd(8): in the Linux seccomp-bpf sandbox, allow mprotect(2) with
   PROT_(READ|WRITE|NONE) only. This syscall is used by some hardened
   heap allocators. Github PR#142

 * sshd(8): in the Linux seccomp-bpf sandbox, allow the s390-specific
   ioctl for ECC hardware support.

 * All: use "doc" man page format if the mandoc(1) tool is present on
   the system. Previously configure would not select the "doc" man
   page format if mandoc was present but nroff was not.

 * sshd(8): don't install duplicate STREAMS modules on Solaris; check
   if STREAMS modules are already installed on a pty before installing
   since when compiling with XPG>=4 they will likely be installed
   already. Prevents hangs and duplicate lines on the terminal.
   bz#2945 and bz#2998,

diffstat:

 security/openssh/Makefile             |   5 ++---
 security/openssh/PLIST                |   4 +++-
 security/openssh/distinfo             |  12 ++++++------
 security/openssh/patches/patch-sshd.c |  14 ++++++++------
 4 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

diffs (102 lines):

diff -r 37d2eabdbfe5 -r 6ccb56286e9a security/openssh/Makefile
--- a/security/openssh/Makefile Wed May 27 13:00:58 2020 +0000
+++ b/security/openssh/Makefile Wed May 27 13:49:27 2020 +0000
@@ -1,8 +1,7 @@
-# $NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.264 2020/04/27 04:08:43 rillig Exp $
+# $NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.265 2020/05/27 13:49:27 sevan Exp $
 
-DISTNAME=              openssh-8.0p1
+DISTNAME=              openssh-8.3p1
 PKGNAME=               ${DISTNAME:S/p1/.1/}
-PKGREVISION=           4
 CATEGORIES=            security
 MASTER_SITES=          ${MASTER_SITE_OPENBSD:=OpenSSH/portable/}
 
diff -r 37d2eabdbfe5 -r 6ccb56286e9a security/openssh/PLIST
--- a/security/openssh/PLIST    Wed May 27 13:00:58 2020 +0000
+++ b/security/openssh/PLIST    Wed May 27 13:49:27 2020 +0000
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-@comment $NetBSD: PLIST,v 1.19 2017/01/19 03:50:53 maya Exp $
+@comment $NetBSD: PLIST,v 1.20 2020/05/27 13:49:27 sevan Exp $
 bin/scp
 bin/sftp
 bin/ssh
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
 libexec/sftp-server
 libexec/ssh-keysign
 libexec/ssh-pkcs11-helper
+libexec/ssh-sk-helper
 man/man1/scp.1
 man/man1/sftp.1
 man/man1/ssh-add.1
@@ -22,6 +23,7 @@
 man/man8/sftp-server.8
 man/man8/ssh-keysign.8
 man/man8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8
+man/man8/ssh-sk-helper.8
 man/man8/sshd.8
 sbin/sshd
 share/examples/openssh/moduli
diff -r 37d2eabdbfe5 -r 6ccb56286e9a security/openssh/distinfo
--- a/security/openssh/distinfo Wed May 27 13:00:58 2020 +0000
+++ b/security/openssh/distinfo Wed May 27 13:49:27 2020 +0000
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
-$NetBSD: distinfo,v 1.109 2019/09/06 09:03:00 manu Exp $
+$NetBSD: distinfo,v 1.110 2020/05/27 13:49:27 sevan Exp $
 
-SHA1 (openssh-8.0p1.tar.gz) = 756dbb99193f9541c9206a667eaa27b0fa184a4f
-RMD160 (openssh-8.0p1.tar.gz) = 9c0d0d97a5f9f97329bf334725dfbad53576d612
-SHA512 (openssh-8.0p1.tar.gz) = e280fa2d56f550efd37c5d2477670326261aa8b94d991f9eb17aad90e0c6c9c939efa90fe87d33260d0f709485cb05c379f0fd1bd44fc0d5190298b6398c9982
-Size (openssh-8.0p1.tar.gz) = 1597697 bytes
+SHA1 (openssh-8.3p1.tar.gz) = 04c7adb9986f16746588db8988b910530c589819
+RMD160 (openssh-8.3p1.tar.gz) = 2203f2e7591ccf292dc05fccd8ea46d0fe19d88d
+SHA512 (openssh-8.3p1.tar.gz) = b5232f7c85bf59ae2ff9d17b030117012e257e3b8c0d5ac60bb139a85b1fbf298b40f2e04203a2e13ca7273053ed668b9dedd54d3a67a7cb8e8e58c0228c5f40
+Size (openssh-8.3p1.tar.gz) = 1706358 bytes
 SHA1 (patch-Makefile.in) = 13502b825c13c98b2ba3b84ff4bae9aa664b76b1
 SHA1 (patch-auth.c) = 060a93f5264751769f2fdf98fefd154bd80c0c5f
 SHA1 (patch-clientloop.c) = 4e88fbd14db33f003eb93c30c682a017e102196e
@@ -15,5 +15,5 @@
 SHA1 (patch-openbsd-compat_port-tun.c) = 4b1b55b7fdc319e011d249ee336301b17a589228
 SHA1 (patch-sandbox-darwin.c) = c9a1fe2e4dbf98e929d983b4206a244e0e354b75
 SHA1 (patch-sshd.8) = 5bf48cd27cef8e8810b9dc7115f5180102a345d1
-SHA1 (patch-sshd.c) = 825eeec13608859852f4cfdeaceedce21bd2f164
+SHA1 (patch-sshd.c) = b3674e9f467323d1852dd988a408ac23896f6700
 SHA1 (patch-sshkey.h) = 8e6758a5f78eb48fae2df6efe8ddb9f5d4a71f7b
diff -r 37d2eabdbfe5 -r 6ccb56286e9a security/openssh/patches/patch-sshd.c
--- a/security/openssh/patches/patch-sshd.c     Wed May 27 13:00:58 2020 +0000
+++ b/security/openssh/patches/patch-sshd.c     Wed May 27 13:49:27 2020 +0000
@@ -1,10 +1,12 @@
-$NetBSD: patch-sshd.c,v 1.11 2019/05/01 17:59:56 maya Exp $
+$NetBSD: patch-sshd.c,v 1.12 2020/05/27 13:49:27 sevan Exp $
 
---- sshd.c.orig        2019-04-17 22:52:57.000000000 +0000
+* Revive tcp_wrappers support.
+
+--- sshd.c.orig        2020-05-27 00:38:00.000000000 +0000
 +++ sshd.c
-@@ -123,6 +123,13 @@
- #include "version.h"
+@@ -124,6 +124,13 @@
  #include "ssherr.h"
+ #include "sk-api.h"
  
 +#ifdef LIBWRAP
 +#include <tcpd.h>
@@ -16,7 +18,7 @@
  /* Re-exec fds */
  #define REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD  (STDERR_FILENO + 1)
  #define REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD                (STDERR_FILENO + 2)
-@@ -534,10 +541,17 @@ privsep_preauth(struct ssh *ssh)
+@@ -538,10 +545,17 @@ privsep_preauth(struct ssh *ssh)
                /* Arrange for logging to be sent to the monitor */
                set_log_handler(mm_log_handler, pmonitor);
  
@@ -34,7 +36,7 @@
  
                return 0;
        }
-@@ -2053,6 +2067,25 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+@@ -2132,6 +2146,25 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
        audit_connection_from(remote_ip, remote_port);
  #endif