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[pkgsrc/pkgsrc-2020Q2]: pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel413 Pullup ticket #6307 - re...
details: https://anonhg.NetBSD.org/pkgsrc/rev/93f3943ef0f5
branches: pkgsrc-2020Q2
changeset: 437624:93f3943ef0f5
user: bsiegert <bsiegert%pkgsrc.org@localhost>
date: Fri Aug 28 15:37:42 2020 +0000
description:
Pullup ticket #6307 - requested by bouyer
sysutils/xenkernel413: security fix
Revisions pulled up:
- sysutils/xenkernel413/Makefile 1.2
- sysutils/xenkernel413/distinfo 1.2
- sysutils/xenkernel413/patches/patch-XSA317 1.1
- sysutils/xenkernel413/patches/patch-XSA319 1.1
- sysutils/xenkernel413/patches/patch-XSA320 1.1
- sysutils/xenkernel413/patches/patch-XSA321 1.1
- sysutils/xenkernel413/patches/patch-XSA328 1.1
---
Module Name: pkgsrc
Committed By: bouyer
Date: Thu Jul 16 09:56:47 UTC 2020
Modified Files:
pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel413: Makefile distinfo
Added Files:
pkgsrc/sysutils/xenkernel413/patches: patch-XSA317 patch-XSA319
patch-XSA320 patch-XSA321 patch-XSA328
Log Message:
Add patches for Xen Security Advisories XSA317, XSA319, XSA320, XSA321
and XSA328.
Bump PKGREVISION
diffstat:
sysutils/xenkernel413/Makefile | 4 +-
sysutils/xenkernel413/distinfo | 7 +-
sysutils/xenkernel413/patches/patch-XSA317 | 52 ++
sysutils/xenkernel413/patches/patch-XSA319 | 29 +
sysutils/xenkernel413/patches/patch-XSA320 | 334 ++++++++++++++++
sysutils/xenkernel413/patches/patch-XSA321 | 584 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
sysutils/xenkernel413/patches/patch-XSA328 | 212 ++++++++++
7 files changed, 1219 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diffs (truncated from 1264 to 300 lines):
diff -r 3fd0382f1efc -r 93f3943ef0f5 sysutils/xenkernel413/Makefile
--- a/sysutils/xenkernel413/Makefile Tue Aug 25 18:36:06 2020 +0000
+++ b/sysutils/xenkernel413/Makefile Fri Aug 28 15:37:42 2020 +0000
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-# $NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.1 2020/05/26 11:12:10 bouyer Exp $
+# $NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.1.2.1 2020/08/28 15:37:42 bsiegert Exp $
VERSION= 4.13.1
-#PKGREVISION= 1
+PKGREVISION= 1
DISTNAME= xen-${VERSION}
PKGNAME= xenkernel413-${VERSION}
CATEGORIES= sysutils
diff -r 3fd0382f1efc -r 93f3943ef0f5 sysutils/xenkernel413/distinfo
--- a/sysutils/xenkernel413/distinfo Tue Aug 25 18:36:06 2020 +0000
+++ b/sysutils/xenkernel413/distinfo Fri Aug 28 15:37:42 2020 +0000
@@ -1,10 +1,15 @@
-$NetBSD: distinfo,v 1.1 2020/05/26 11:12:10 bouyer Exp $
+$NetBSD: distinfo,v 1.1.2.1 2020/08/28 15:37:42 bsiegert Exp $
SHA1 (xen413/xen-4.13.1.tar.gz) = 194a314171120dad0b3c5433104c92343ec884ba
RMD160 (xen413/xen-4.13.1.tar.gz) = 29cfb90b9da0ede99c1228b8e5964a99547c205d
SHA512 (xen413/xen-4.13.1.tar.gz) = b56d20704155d98d803496cba83eb928e0f986a750831cd5600fc88d0ae772fe1456571654375054043d2da8daca255cc98385ebf08b1b1a75ecf7f4b7a0ee90
Size (xen413/xen-4.13.1.tar.gz) = 39024612 bytes
SHA1 (patch-Config.mk) = 9372a09efd05c9fbdbc06f8121e411fcb7c7ba65
+SHA1 (patch-XSA317) = 3a3e7bf8f115bebaf56001afcf68c2bd501c00a5
+SHA1 (patch-XSA319) = 4954bdc849666e1c735c3281256e4850c0594ee8
+SHA1 (patch-XSA320) = db978d49298660fb750dc6b50c2a1ddd099c8fa0
+SHA1 (patch-XSA321) = 257dfc7e15a63b2149a9b9aed4e6e3b10f01f551
+SHA1 (patch-XSA328) = eb86e10b7279318006a8593561e3932b76adbc0c
SHA1 (patch-xen_Makefile) = 465388d80de414ca3bb84faefa0f52d817e423a6
SHA1 (patch-xen_Rules.mk) = c743dc63f51fc280d529a7d9e08650292c171dac
SHA1 (patch-xen_arch_x86_Rules.mk) = 0bedfc53a128a87b6a249ae04fbdf6a053bfb70b
diff -r 3fd0382f1efc -r 93f3943ef0f5 sysutils/xenkernel413/patches/patch-XSA317
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000
+++ b/sysutils/xenkernel413/patches/patch-XSA317 Fri Aug 28 15:37:42 2020 +0000
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+$NetBSD: patch-XSA317,v 1.1.2.2 2020/08/28 15:37:42 bsiegert Exp $
+
+From aeb46e92f915f19a61d5a8a1f4b696793f64e6fb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Julien Grall <jgrall%amazon.com@localhost>
+Date: Thu, 19 Mar 2020 13:17:31 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] xen/common: event_channel: Don't ignore error in
+ get_free_port()
+
+Currently, get_free_port() is assuming that the port has been allocated
+when evtchn_allocate_port() is not return -EBUSY.
+
+However, the function may return an error when:
+ - We exhausted all the event channels. This can happen if the limit
+ configured by the administrator for the guest ('max_event_channels'
+ in xl cfg) is higher than the ABI used by the guest. For instance,
+ if the guest is using 2L, the limit should not be higher than 4095.
+ - We cannot allocate memory (e.g Xen has not more memory).
+
+Users of get_free_port() (such as EVTCHNOP_alloc_unbound) will validly
+assuming the port was valid and will next call evtchn_from_port(). This
+will result to a crash as the memory backing the event channel structure
+is not present.
+
+Fixes: 368ae9a05fe ("xen/pvshim: forward evtchn ops between L0 Xen and L2 DomU")
+Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <jgrall%amazon.com@localhost>
+Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich%suse.com@localhost>
+---
+ xen/common/event_channel.c | 8 ++++----
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/xen/common/event_channel.c b/xen/common/event_channel.c
+index e86e2bfab0..a8d182b584 100644
+--- xen/common/event_channel.c.orig
++++ xen/common/event_channel.c
+@@ -195,10 +195,10 @@ static int get_free_port(struct domain *d)
+ {
+ int rc = evtchn_allocate_port(d, port);
+
+- if ( rc == -EBUSY )
+- continue;
+-
+- return port;
++ if ( rc == 0 )
++ return port;
++ else if ( rc != -EBUSY )
++ return rc;
+ }
+
+ return -ENOSPC;
+--
+2.17.1
+
diff -r 3fd0382f1efc -r 93f3943ef0f5 sysutils/xenkernel413/patches/patch-XSA319
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000
+++ b/sysutils/xenkernel413/patches/patch-XSA319 Fri Aug 28 15:37:42 2020 +0000
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+$NetBSD: patch-XSA319,v 1.1.2.2 2020/08/28 15:37:42 bsiegert Exp $
+
+From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich%suse.com@localhost>
+Subject: x86/shadow: correct an inverted conditional in dirty VRAM tracking
+
+This originally was "mfn_x(mfn) == INVALID_MFN". Make it like this
+again, taking the opportunity to also drop the unnecessary nearby
+braces.
+
+This is XSA-319.
+
+Fixes: 246a5a3377c2 ("xen: Use a typesafe to define INVALID_MFN")
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich%suse.com@localhost>
+Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3%citrix.com@localhost>
+
+--- xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c.orig
++++ xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
+@@ -3252,10 +3252,8 @@ int shadow_track_dirty_vram(struct domai
+ int dirty = 0;
+ paddr_t sl1ma = dirty_vram->sl1ma[i];
+
+- if ( !mfn_eq(mfn, INVALID_MFN) )
+- {
++ if ( mfn_eq(mfn, INVALID_MFN) )
+ dirty = 1;
+- }
+ else
+ {
+ page = mfn_to_page(mfn);
diff -r 3fd0382f1efc -r 93f3943ef0f5 sysutils/xenkernel413/patches/patch-XSA320
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000
+++ b/sysutils/xenkernel413/patches/patch-XSA320 Fri Aug 28 15:37:42 2020 +0000
@@ -0,0 +1,334 @@
+$NetBSD: patch-XSA320,v 1.1.2.2 2020/08/28 15:37:42 bsiegert Exp $
+
+From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3%citrix.com@localhost>
+Subject: x86/spec-ctrl: CPUID/MSR definitions for Special Register Buffer Data Sampling
+
+This is part of XSA-320 / CVE-2020-0543
+
+Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3%citrix.com@localhost>
+Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich%suse.com@localhost>
+Acked-by: Wei Liu <wl%xen.org@localhost>
+
+diff --git a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc
+index 1d9d816622..9268454297 100644
+--- docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc.orig
++++ docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc
+@@ -483,10 +483,10 @@ accounting for hardware capabilities as enumerated via CPUID.
+
+ Currently accepted:
+
+-The Speculation Control hardware features `md-clear`, `ibrsb`, `stibp`, `ibpb`,
+-`l1d-flush` and `ssbd` are used by default if available and applicable. They can
+-be ignored, e.g. `no-ibrsb`, at which point Xen won't use them itself, and
+-won't offer them to guests.
++The Speculation Control hardware features `srbds-ctrl`, `md-clear`, `ibrsb`,
++`stibp`, `ibpb`, `l1d-flush` and `ssbd` are used by default if available and
++applicable. They can be ignored, e.g. `no-ibrsb`, at which point Xen won't
++use them itself, and won't offer them to guests.
+
+ ### cpuid_mask_cpu
+ > `= fam_0f_rev_[cdefg] | fam_10_rev_[bc] | fam_11_rev_b`
+diff --git a/tools/libxl/libxl_cpuid.c b/tools/libxl/libxl_cpuid.c
+index 6cea4227ba..a78f08b927 100644
+--- tools/libxl/libxl_cpuid.c.orig
++++ tools/libxl/libxl_cpuid.c
+@@ -213,6 +213,7 @@ int libxl_cpuid_parse_config(libxl_cpuid_policy_list *cpuid, const char* str)
+
+ {"avx512-4vnniw",0x00000007, 0, CPUID_REG_EDX, 2, 1},
+ {"avx512-4fmaps",0x00000007, 0, CPUID_REG_EDX, 3, 1},
++ {"srbds-ctrl", 0x00000007, 0, CPUID_REG_EDX, 9, 1},
+ {"md-clear", 0x00000007, 0, CPUID_REG_EDX, 10, 1},
+ {"cet-ibt", 0x00000007, 0, CPUID_REG_EDX, 20, 1},
+ {"ibrsb", 0x00000007, 0, CPUID_REG_EDX, 26, 1},
+diff --git a/tools/misc/xen-cpuid.c b/tools/misc/xen-cpuid.c
+index 603e1d65fd..a09440813b 100644
+--- tools/misc/xen-cpuid.c.orig
++++ tools/misc/xen-cpuid.c
+@@ -157,6 +157,7 @@ static const char *const str_7d0[32] =
+ [ 2] = "avx512_4vnniw", [ 3] = "avx512_4fmaps",
+ [ 4] = "fsrm",
+
++ /* 8 */ [ 9] = "srbds-ctrl",
+ [10] = "md-clear",
+ /* 12 */ [13] = "tsx-force-abort",
+
+diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/msr.c b/xen/arch/x86/msr.c
+index 4b12103482..0cded3c0ad 100644
+--- xen/arch/x86/msr.c.orig
++++ xen/arch/x86/msr.c
+@@ -134,6 +134,7 @@ int guest_rdmsr(struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr, uint64_t *val)
+ /* Write-only */
+ case MSR_TSX_FORCE_ABORT:
+ case MSR_TSX_CTRL:
++ case MSR_MCU_OPT_CTRL:
+ case MSR_U_CET:
+ case MSR_S_CET:
+ case MSR_PL0_SSP ... MSR_INTERRUPT_SSP_TABLE:
+@@ -288,6 +289,7 @@ int guest_wrmsr(struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr, uint64_t val)
+ /* Read-only */
+ case MSR_TSX_FORCE_ABORT:
+ case MSR_TSX_CTRL:
++ case MSR_MCU_OPT_CTRL:
+ case MSR_U_CET:
+ case MSR_S_CET:
+ case MSR_PL0_SSP ... MSR_INTERRUPT_SSP_TABLE:
+diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
+index 6656c44aec..5fc1c6827e 100644
+--- xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c.orig
++++ xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
+@@ -312,12 +312,13 @@ static void __init print_details(enum ind_thunk thunk, uint64_t caps)
+ printk("Speculative mitigation facilities:\n");
+
+ /* Hardware features which pertain to speculative mitigations. */
+- printk(" Hardware features:%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s\n",
++ printk(" Hardware features:%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s\n",
+ (_7d0 & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_IBRSB)) ? " IBRS/IBPB" : "",
+ (_7d0 & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_STIBP)) ? " STIBP" : "",
+ (_7d0 & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_L1D_FLUSH)) ? " L1D_FLUSH" : "",
+ (_7d0 & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_SSBD)) ? " SSBD" : "",
+ (_7d0 & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR)) ? " MD_CLEAR" : "",
++ (_7d0 & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_SRBDS_CTRL)) ? " SRBDS_CTRL" : "",
+ (e8b & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) ? " IBPB" : "",
+ (caps & ARCH_CAPS_IBRS_ALL) ? " IBRS_ALL" : "",
+ (caps & ARCH_CAPS_RDCL_NO) ? " RDCL_NO" : "",
+diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
+index 7693c4a71a..91994669e1 100644
+--- xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h.orig
++++ xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
+@@ -179,6 +179,9 @@
+ #define MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_ENTRY_CTLS 0x490
+ #define MSR_IA32_VMX_VMFUNC 0x491
+
++#define MSR_MCU_OPT_CTRL 0x00000123
++#define MCU_OPT_CTRL_RNGDS_MITG_DIS (_AC(1, ULL) << 0)
++
+ #define MSR_U_CET 0x000006a0
+ #define MSR_S_CET 0x000006a2
+ #define MSR_PL0_SSP 0x000006a4
+diff --git a/xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h b/xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h
+index 2835688f1c..a2482c3627 100644
+--- xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h.orig
++++ xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h
+@@ -252,6 +252,7 @@ XEN_CPUFEATURE(IBPB, 8*32+12) /*A IBPB support only (no IBRS, used by
+ /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0.edx, word 9 */
+ XEN_CPUFEATURE(AVX512_4VNNIW, 9*32+ 2) /*A AVX512 Neural Network Instructions */
+ XEN_CPUFEATURE(AVX512_4FMAPS, 9*32+ 3) /*A AVX512 Multiply Accumulation Single Precision */
++XEN_CPUFEATURE(SRBDS_CTRL, 9*32+ 9) /* MSR_MCU_OPT_CTRL and RNGDS_MITG_DIS. */
+ XEN_CPUFEATURE(MD_CLEAR, 9*32+10) /*A VERW clears microarchitectural buffers */
+ XEN_CPUFEATURE(TSX_FORCE_ABORT, 9*32+13) /* MSR_TSX_FORCE_ABORT.RTM_ABORT */
+ XEN_CPUFEATURE(CET_IBT, 9*32+20) /* CET - Indirect Branch Tracking */
+From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3%citrix.com@localhost>
+Subject: x86/spec-ctrl: Mitigate the Special Register Buffer Data Sampling sidechannel
+
+See patch documentation and comments.
+
+This is part of XSA-320 / CVE-2020-0543
+
+Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3%citrix.com@localhost>
+Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich%suse.com@localhost>
+
+diff --git a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc
+index 9268454297..c780312531 100644
+--- docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc.orig
++++ docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc
+@@ -1991,7 +1991,7 @@ By default SSBD will be mitigated at runtime (i.e `ssbd=runtime`).
+ ### spec-ctrl (x86)
+ > `= List of [ <bool>, xen=<bool>, {pv,hvm,msr-sc,rsb,md-clear}=<bool>,
+ > bti-thunk=retpoline|lfence|jmp, {ibrs,ibpb,ssbd,eager-fpu,
+-> l1d-flush,branch-harden}=<bool> ]`
++> l1d-flush,branch-harden,srb-lock}=<bool> ]`
+
+ Controls for speculative execution sidechannel mitigations. By default, Xen
+ will pick the most appropriate mitigations based on compiled in support,
+@@ -2068,6 +2068,12 @@ If Xen is compiled with `CONFIG_SPECULATIVE_HARDEN_BRANCH`, the
+ speculation barriers to protect selected conditional branches. By default,
+ Xen will enable this mitigation.
+
++On hardware supporting SRBDS_CTRL, the `srb-lock=` option can be used to force
++or prevent Xen from protect the Special Register Buffer from leaking stale
++data. By default, Xen will enable this mitigation, except on parts where MDS
++is fixed and TAA is fixed/mitigated (in which case, there is believed to be no
++way for an attacker to obtain the stale data).
++
+ ### sync_console
+ > `= <boolean>`
+
+diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/acpi/power.c b/xen/arch/x86/acpi/power.c
+index feb0f6ce20..75c6e34164 100644
+--- xen/arch/x86/acpi/power.c.orig
++++ xen/arch/x86/acpi/power.c
+@@ -295,6 +295,9 @@ static int enter_state(u32 state)
+ ci->spec_ctrl_flags |= (default_spec_ctrl_flags & SCF_ist_wrmsr);
+ spec_ctrl_exit_idle(ci);
+
++ if ( boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SRBDS_CTRL) )
++ wrmsrl(MSR_MCU_OPT_CTRL, default_xen_mcu_opt_ctrl);
++
+ done:
+ spin_debug_enable();
+ local_irq_restore(flags);
+diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c b/xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c
+index dc8fdac1a1..b1e51b3aff 100644
+--- xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c.orig
++++ xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c
+@@ -361,12 +361,14 @@ void start_secondary(void *unused)
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