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[src/trunk]: src/sys/arch/x86/x86 Add AMD_SSB_NO, so that we explicitly say t...
details: https://anonhg.NetBSD.org/src/rev/0e497f18b5d5
branches: trunk
changeset: 995425:0e497f18b5d5
user: maxv <maxv%NetBSD.org@localhost>
date: Sat Dec 22 09:20:30 2018 +0000
description:
Add AMD_SSB_NO, so that we explicitly say than an AMD CPU is not affected
when it's not affected.
diffstat:
sys/arch/x86/x86/spectre.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++---------
1 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diffs (100 lines):
diff -r 9c32c5456dfc -r 0e497f18b5d5 sys/arch/x86/x86/spectre.c
--- a/sys/arch/x86/x86/spectre.c Sat Dec 22 08:59:44 2018 +0000
+++ b/sys/arch/x86/x86/spectre.c Sat Dec 22 09:20:30 2018 +0000
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $NetBSD: spectre.c,v 1.20 2018/12/22 08:59:44 maxv Exp $ */
+/* $NetBSD: spectre.c,v 1.21 2018/12/22 09:20:30 maxv Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2018 NetBSD Foundation, Inc.
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
*/
#include <sys/cdefs.h>
-__KERNEL_RCSID(0, "$NetBSD: spectre.c,v 1.20 2018/12/22 08:59:44 maxv Exp $");
+__KERNEL_RCSID(0, "$NetBSD: spectre.c,v 1.21 2018/12/22 09:20:30 maxv Exp $");
#include "opt_spectre.h"
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@
V4_MITIGATION_NONE,
V4_MITIGATION_INTEL_SSBD,
V4_MITIGATION_INTEL_SSB_NO,
+ V4_MITIGATION_AMD_SSB_NO,
V4_MITIGATION_AMD_NONARCH_F15H,
V4_MITIGATION_AMD_NONARCH_F16H,
V4_MITIGATION_AMD_NONARCH_F17H
@@ -380,6 +381,9 @@
case V4_MITIGATION_INTEL_SSB_NO:
strlcat(name, "[Intel SSB_NO]", sizeof(name));
break;
+ case V4_MITIGATION_AMD_SSB_NO:
+ strlcat(name, "[AMD SSB_NO]", sizeof(name));
+ break;
case V4_MITIGATION_AMD_NONARCH_F15H:
case V4_MITIGATION_AMD_NONARCH_F16H:
case V4_MITIGATION_AMD_NONARCH_F17H:
@@ -403,11 +407,7 @@
if (cpu_info_primary.ci_feat_val[7] & CPUID_SEF_ARCH_CAP) {
msr = rdmsr(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES);
if (msr & IA32_ARCH_SSB_NO) {
- /*
- * The processor indicates it is not vulnerable
- * to the Speculative Store Bypass (SpectreV4)
- * flaw.
- */
+ /* Not vulnerable to SpectreV4. */
v4_mitigation_method = V4_MITIGATION_INTEL_SSB_NO;
return;
}
@@ -432,6 +432,16 @@
v4_mitigation_method = V4_MITIGATION_AMD_NONARCH_F17H;
return;
default:
+ if (cpu_info_primary.ci_max_ext_cpuid < 0x80000008) {
+ break;
+ }
+ x86_cpuid(0x80000008, descs);
+ if (descs[1] & __BIT(26)) {
+ /* Not vulnerable to SpectreV4. */
+ v4_mitigation_method = V4_MITIGATION_AMD_SSB_NO;
+ return;
+ }
+
break;
}
}
@@ -447,6 +457,7 @@
switch (v4_mitigation_method) {
case V4_MITIGATION_NONE:
case V4_MITIGATION_INTEL_SSB_NO:
+ case V4_MITIGATION_AMD_SSB_NO:
panic("impossible");
case V4_MITIGATION_INTEL_SSBD:
msrval = MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL;
@@ -527,6 +538,7 @@
v4_set_name();
return 0;
case V4_MITIGATION_INTEL_SSB_NO:
+ case V4_MITIGATION_AMD_SSB_NO:
printf("[+] The CPU is not affected by SpectreV4\n");
mutex_exit(&cpu_lock);
return 0;
@@ -623,13 +635,15 @@
v4_set_name();
}
if (v4_mitigation_method != V4_MITIGATION_NONE &&
- v4_mitigation_method != V4_MITIGATION_INTEL_SSB_NO) {
+ v4_mitigation_method != V4_MITIGATION_INTEL_SSB_NO &&
+ v4_mitigation_method != V4_MITIGATION_AMD_SSB_NO) {
mitigation_v4_apply_cpu(ci, true);
}
#else
if (ci == &cpu_info_primary) {
v4_detect_method();
- if (v4_mitigation_method == V4_MITIGATION_INTEL_SSB_NO) {
+ if (v4_mitigation_method == V4_MITIGATION_INTEL_SSB_NO ||
+ v4_mitigation_method == V4_MITIGATION_AMD_SSB_NO) {
v4_mitigation_enabled = true;
v4_set_name();
}
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