Subject: Re: setuid ssh
To: Andrew Brown <atatat@atatdot.net>
From: Bill Sommerfeld <sommerfeld@orchard.arlington.ma.us>
List: tech-security
Date: 10/18/2000 09:51:40
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To: Andrew Brown <atatat@atatdot.net>
Cc: Atsushi Onoe <onoe@sm.sony.co.jp>, cjs@cynic.net,
hubert.feyrer@informatik.fh-regensburg.de, tech-security@netbsd.org
Subject: Re: setuid ssh
In-Reply-To: Message from Andrew Brown <atatat@atatdot.net>
of "Wed, 18 Oct 2000 09:47:11 EDT." <20001018094711.A29595@noc.untraceable.net>
Reply-To: sommerfeld@orchard.arlington.ma.us
Date: Wed, 18 Oct 2000 09:51:40 -0400
From: Bill Sommerfeld <sommerfeld@orchard.arlington.ma.us>
Message-Id: <20001018135146.300E22A2A@orchard.arlington.ma.us>
> ssh-agent should be changed anyway. what it *should* do is store the
> decrypted key for a period of time and then expunge it (ala kerberos's
> tgt, or sudo), requiring the user to reauthenticate periodically.
> once i look more closely at it, i'll have more colorful ideas, i'm
> sure.
yes. IMHO it should generate a new keypair and use the user's
long-term key to sign a short-term "certificate" saying that the
temporary keypair is equivalent to the long-term key for some (short)
lifetime.
- Bill