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Re: Lightweight support for instruction RNGs
On Tue, Dec 22, 2015 at 12:22:57PM -0500, Greg Troxel wrote:
>
> I am only dimly following this, but I have two thoughts:
>
> I see the point that running randomness tests will not detect a
> well-engineered attack. But it probably will detect a large class of
> implementation bugs, so it seems worth doing.
If you do such a test on the final output to userspace, it cannot catch
any implementation bug in any stage of the machinery prior to the CTR_DRBG.
Since there were no changes to the CTR_DRBG (or the driver that reads
its output) the proposed test cannot actually detect any implementation
bug that could have happened in the code I posted.
Running tests that one knows cannot actually find bugs is not a practice
I am eager to engage in. In fact, when I catch developers writing "tests"
like that rather than real unit or regression test, I generally give them
hell.
Thor
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