Re: a more detailed analysis of "known IV" vulnerability.

[RJ Atkinson <rja%extremenetworks.com@localhost>]

On Saturday, March 16, 2002, at 07:13 , David Wagner wrote:
>  I think it's reasonable to conclude that this attack will not
> be easiest way to break SSH sessions.

This has been my conclusion as well, based largely on
Ross Anderson's paper on how crypto is typically broken.

> I believe this rationale should be carefully explained in the SSH RFC.
> Otherwise, some readers might get the wrong impression.  Also, it will
> help inform those who might re-use the SSH encoding transform without
> also maintaining the upper layers that they are in a danger zone.

I'm not sure whether the detailed analysis really belongs in the
core SSH RFCs.  Documenting in some RFC, possibly a parallel RFC
with Informational status, seems eminently reasonable.

Ran