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Re: preliminary version of counter mode draft
[responding to 4-month-old mail]
> I'm curious why all of these were here:
>
> > twofish128-ctr RECOMMENDED Twofish in SDCTR mode,
> > with 128-bit key
> > twofish192-ctr OPTIONAL Twofish with 192-bit key
> > twofish256-ctr OPTIONAL Twofish with 256-bit key
> > serpent128-ctr RECOMMENDED Serpent in SDCTR mode, with
> > with 128-bit key
> > serpent192-ctr OPTIONAL Serpent with 192-bit key
> > serpent256-ctr OPTIONAL Serpent with 256-bit key
>
> Serpent and Twofish treat 128, 192 and 256 bit keys basically the
> same anyway (unlike AES, where all three different versions might be
> useful). Obviously there is no reason _not to have them all (besides
> a fairly small amount of extra work for implementors), but it seems
> pointless, given that serpent256-ctr and twofish256-ctr would do the
> job of all six of these just fine.
I didn't see a response to this..
I don't (wg chair hat off) think it makes a lot of sense to any of the
include AES runners-up at anything above OPTIONAL but I don't feel
particully strongly about it either way.
Regarding the key lengths, though, there are enough regulatory/policy
issues out there (for instance, additional paperwork required for
export of sw or hw doing key sizes over 128 bits) that we're better
off specifying and negotiating all believed-to-be-strong key lengths
separately -- if we were to only do a 256-bit version, it might cause
certain vendors to omit the algorithm entirely.
- Bill
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