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Re: WG Chair comments on draft-ietf-secsh-agent-01.txt
On Tue, Jul 15, 2003 at 06:25:52PM -0400, Bill Sommerfeld wrote:
> Two comments:
>
> 1) "split" references (there's only one and it's normative)
>
> 2) security considerations section doesn't mention the case where you
> do an ssh-add into a forwarded agent connection. While this
> exchange is protected via encryption, it does involve casually
> moving a long-term public keypair over the net to a remote system,
> which should raise a few eyebrows..
>
> It is not clear to me what we should do about this. Either we should:
>
> a) suggest that implementations detect and warn about this case,
>
> or
>
> b) redesign the protocol so that SSH_AGENT_PRIVATE_KEY_OP requests
> flow towards the node with the key rather than having all keys and
> requests flow to the "root" agent.
>
> Any comments from the rest of the WG?
Perhaps an optional message could be added to indicate that a node has
added a key to the [now distributed] agent. Of course, now we'd have
bidirectional agent channels, with requests and responses going in
either direction.
Nico
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