Re: Your DISCUSS on draft-ietf-secsh-newmodes-05

[Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf%mit.edu@localhost>]

>>>>> "Jon" == Jon Bright <jon%siliconcircus.com@localhost> writes:

    Jon> der Mouse wrote:
    >> One is that people working on implementations which don't have
    >> room for two ciphers will end up doing DES instead of something
    >> faster and more secure; see below.

    Jon> But if they're implementing the core drafts and taking any
    Jon> notice of the REQUIRED entries, they'll already be doing DES.
    Jon> I'd *prefer* to REQUIRE aes-ctr, but given the situation in
    Jon> the core drafts, it's exactly to accomodate these people that
    Jon> I suggest requiring DES.

I think this is actually a compelling argument for not requiring
anything at the present time.  We want to require aes-ctr (or at least
I do), but we cannot get consensus to do so now.

We recommend aes-ctr and say that when we update the 2026
applicability statement for the core ssh protocol we expect to require
aes-ctr.