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Re: agent draft updated



On Sun, 25 Feb 2024, Mouse wrote:

> 
> > Please take a look at the latest version:
> 
> > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-miller-ssh-agent-12
> 
> Is this available anywhere not requiring use of HTTPS?

attached



Internet Engineering Task Force                                D. Miller
Internet-Draft                                                   OpenSSH
Intended status: Informational                          26 February 2024
Expires: 29 August 2024


                           SSH Agent Protocol
                       draft-miller-ssh-agent-12

Abstract

   This document describes a key agent protocol for use in the Secure
   Shell (SSH) protocol.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 29 August 2024.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components
   extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
   described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.







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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Protocol Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  Generic server responses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.2.  Adding keys to the agent  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
       3.2.1.  DSA keys  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       3.2.2.  ECDSA keys  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       3.2.3.  EDDSA keys  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       3.2.4.  RSA keys  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       3.2.5.  Other keys  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       3.2.6.  Adding keys from a token  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       3.2.7.  Key Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.3.  Public key encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.4.  Removing keys from the agent  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.5.  Requesting a list of keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     3.6.  Private key operations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       3.6.1.  Signature flags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     3.7.  Locking and unlocking an agent  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     3.8.  Extension mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       3.8.1.  Query extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   4.  Forwarding access to an agent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     4.1.  Advertising agent forwarding support  . . . . . . . . . .  13
     4.2.  Requesting agent forwarding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     4.3.  Agent connection requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   5.  Protocol numbers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     5.1.  Message numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
       5.1.1.  Reserved message numbers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     5.2.  Constraint identifiers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     5.3.  Signature flags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     6.1.  New registry: SSH agent protocol numbers  . . . . . . . .  16
     6.2.  New registry: SSH agent key constraint numbers  . . . . .  18
     6.3.  New registry: SSH agent signature flags . . . . . . . . .  19
     6.4.  New registry: SSH agent extension request names . . . . .  19
     6.5.  Additions to SSH Extension Names  . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     6.6.  Additions to SSH Connection Protocol Channel Request
           Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     6.7.  Additions to SSH Connection Protocol Channel Types  . . .  20
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
   Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23




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1.  Introduction

   Secure Shell (SSH) is a protocol for secure remote connections and
   login over untrusted networks.  It supports multiple authentication
   mechanisms, including public key authentication.  This document
   describes the protocol for interacting with an agent that holds
   private keys.  Clients (and possibly servers) can use invoke the
   agent via this protocol to perform operations using public and
   private keys held in the agent.

   Holding keys in an agent offers usability and security advantages to
   loading and unwrapping them at each use.  Moreover, the agent
   implements a simple protocol and presents a smaller attack surface
   than a key loaded into a full SSH server or client.

   This agent protocol is already widely used and a de-facto standard,
   having been implemented by a number of popular SSH clients and
   servers for many years.  The purpose of this document is to describe
   the protocol as it has been implemented.

1.1.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

2.  Protocol Overview

   The agent protocol is a packetised request-response protocol, solely
   driven by the client.  It consists of a number of requests sent from
   the client to the server and a set of reply messages that are sent in
   response.  At no time does the server send messages except in
   response to a client request.  Replies are sent in order.

   Agents MAY implement support for only a subset of operations or
   available key types, and MAY additionally refuse abitrary operations
   in particular contexts.  For example, an agent may allow only local
   clients of an agent to add or remove keys, or make particular subsets
   of keys available to a given client.  For this reason, clients of the
   agent SHOULD be prepared to fail gracefully if any operation is
   refused.

   Note that this protocol is separate to and incompatible with the one
   described in the similarly-named [draft-ietf-secsh-agent-02].





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3.  Protocol Messages

   All values in the agent protocol are encoded using the SSH wire
   representations specified by [RFC4251].  Messages consist of a
   length, type and contents.

      uint32            length
      byte              type
      byte[length - 1]  contents

3.1.  Generic server responses

   The following generic messages may be sent by the server in response
   to requests from the client.  On success the agent may reply either
   with:

      byte              SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS

   or a request-specific success message.  On failure, the agent may
   reply with:

      byte              SSH_AGENT_FAILURE

   SSH_AGENT_FAILURE messages are also sent in reply to requests with
   unknown types.

3.2.  Adding keys to the agent

   Keys may be added to the agent using the SSH_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY or
   SSH_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED messages.  The latter variant allows
   adding keys with optional constraints on their usage.

   The generic format for the key SSH_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY message is:

       byte             SSH_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY
       string           key type
       byte[]           key contents
       string           key comment

   Here "type" is the specified key type name, for example "ssh-rsa" for
   a RSA key as defined by [RFC4253]. "contents" consists of the public
   and private components of the key and vary by key type, they are
   listed below for standard and commonly used key types. "comment" is
   an optional human-readable key name or comment as a UTF-8 string that
   may serve to identify the key in user-visible messages.

   The SSH_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED is similar, but adds a extra field:




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       byte             SSH_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED
       string           type
       byte[]           contents
       string           comment
       constraint[]     constraints

   Constraints are used to place limits on the validity or use of keys.
   Section 3.2.7 details constraint types and their format.

   An agent should reply with SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS if the key was
   successfully loaded as a result of one of these messages, or
   SSH_AGENT_FAILURE otherwise.

   An agent MAY support only a subset of the key types defined here and
   may support additional key types as described below.  If an agent
   does not recognise the type name in a request to add a key, then it
   MUST fail gracefully and respond with a SSH_AGENT_FAILURE reply.

3.2.1.  DSA keys

   DSA keys have key type "ssh-dss" and are defined in [RFC4253].  They
   may be added to the agent using the following message.  The
   "constraints" field is only present for the
   SSH_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED message.

       byte             SSH_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY or
                        SSH_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED
       string           "ssh-dss"
       mpint            p
       mpint            q
       mpint            g
       mpint            y
       mpint            x
       string           comment
       constraint[]     constraints

   The "p", "q", "g" values are the DSA domain parameters. "y" and "x"
   are the public and private keys respectively.  These values are as
   defined by [FIPS.186-4].

3.2.2.  ECDSA keys

   ECDSA keys have key types starting with "ecdsa-sha2-" and are defined
   in [RFC5656].  They may be added to the agent using the following
   message.  The "constraints" field is only present for the
   SSH_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED message.





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       byte             SSH_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY or
                        SSH_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED
       string           key type
       string           ecdsa_curve_name
       string           Q
       mpint            d
       string           comment
       constraint[]     constraints

   The values "Q" and "d" are the ECDSA public and private values
   respectively.  Both are defined by [FIPS.186-4].

3.2.3.  EDDSA keys

   [RFC8709] defines Ed25519 and Ed448 with key type names "ssh-ed25519"
   and "ssh-ed448" respectively.  These may be added to the agent using
   the following message.  The "key constraints" field is only present
   for the SSH_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED message.

       byte             SSH_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY or
                        SSH_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED
       string           "ssh-ed25519" or "ssh-ed448"
       string           ENC(A)
       string           k || ENC(A)
       string           comment
       constraint[]     constraints

   The first value is the EDDSA public key ENC(A).  The second value is
   a concatenation of the private key k and the public ENC(A) key.  The
   contents and interpretation of the ENC(A) and k values are defined by
   [RFC8032].

3.2.4.  RSA keys

   RSA keys have key type "ssh-rsa" and are defined in [RFC4253].  They
   may be added to the agent using the following message.  The "key
   constraints" field is only present for the
   SSH_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED message.













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       byte             SSH_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY or
                        SSH_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED
       string           "ssh-rsa"
       mpint            n
       mpint            e
       mpint            d
       mpint            iqmp
       mpint            p
       mpint            q
       string           comment
       constraint[]     constraints

   "n" is the public composite modulus.  "p" and "q" are its constituent
   private prime factors. "e" is the public exponent.  "iqmp" is the
   inverse of "q" modulo "p".  All these values except "iqmp" (which can
   be calculated from the others) are defined by [FIPS.186-4].

3.2.5.  Other keys

   Agents and their clients MAY support additional key types not
   documented here.  Vendor-specific key types should use the domain-
   qualified naming convention defined in Section 4.2 of [RFC4251].

3.2.6.  Adding keys from a token

   Keys hosted on smart-cards or other hardware tokens may be added
   using the SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY and
   SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED requests.  Note that
   "constraints" field is only included for the
   SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED variant of this message.

       byte             SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY or
                        SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED
       string           id
       string           PIN
       constraint[]     constraints

   Here "id" is an opaque identifier for the hardware token and "PIN" is
   an optional password on PIN to unlock the key.  The interpretation of
   "id" is not defined by the protocol but is left solely up to the
   agent.

   Typically only the public components of any keys supported on a
   hardware token will be loaded into an agent so, strictly speaking,
   this message really arranges future private key operations to be
   delegated to the hardware token in question.





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   An agent should reply with SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS if one or more keys were
   successfully loaded as a result of one of these messages, or
   SSH_AGENT_FAILURE if no keys were found.  The agent should also
   return SSH_AGENT_FAILURE if the token "id" was not recognised or if
   the agent doesn't support token-hosted keys at all.

3.2.7.  Key Constraints

   A number of constraints and may be used in the constrained variants
   of the key add messages.  Each constraint is represented by a type
   byte followed by zero or more value bytes.

   Zero or more constraints may be specified when adding a key with one
   of the *_CONSTRAINED requests.  Multiple constraints are appended
   consecutively to the end of the request:

       byte             constraint1_type
       byte[]           constraint1_data
       byte             constraint2_type
       byte[]           constraint2_data
       ....
       byte             constraintN_type
       byte[]           constraintN_data

   If an agent does not recognise or support a requested constraint it
   MUST refuse the request and return a SSH_AGENT_FAILURE message to the
   client.

   The following constraints are defined.

3.2.7.1.  Key lifetime constraint

   This constraint requests that the agent limit the key's lifetime by
   deleting it after the specified duration (in seconds) has elapsed
   from the time the key was added to the agent.

       byte             SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME
       uint32           seconds

3.2.7.2.  Key confirmation constraint

   This constraint requests that the agent require explicit user
   confirmation for each private key operation using the key.  For
   example, the agent could present a confirmation dialog before
   completing a signature operation.

       byte             SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM




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3.2.7.3.  Constraint extensions

   Agents may implement experimental or private-use constraints through
   a extension constraint that supports named constraints.

       byte             SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_EXTENSION
       string           extension name
       byte[]           extension-specific details

   The extension name MUST consist of a UTF-8 string suffixed by the
   implementation domain following the naming scheme defined in
   Section 4.2 of [RFC4251], e.g.  "foo%example.com@localhost".

3.3.  Public key encoding

   Keys previously loaded into an agent are referred to by their public
   key blob, which is the standard SSH wire encoding for public keys.
   SSH protocol key encodings are defined in [RFC4253] for "ssh-rsa" and
   "ssh-dss" keys, in [RFC5656] for "ecdsa-sha2-*" keys and in [RFC8709]
   for "ssh-ed25519" and "ssh-ed448" keys.

3.4.  Removing keys from the agent

   A client may request that an agent remove all keys that it stores:

       byte             SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES

   On receipt of such a message, an agent shall delete all keys that it
   is holding and reply with SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS.

   Specific keys may also be removed:

       byte             SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY
       string           key blob

   Where "key blob" is the standard public key encoding of the key to be
   removed (Section 3.3).

   An agent shall reply with SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS if the key was deleted or
   SSH_AGENT_FAILURE if it was not found.

   Smartcard keys may be removed using:

       byte             SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY
       string           reader id
       string           PIN





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   Where "reader id" is an opaque identifier for the smartcard reader
   and "PIN" is an optional password or PIN (not typically used).
   Requesting deletion of smartcard-hosted keys SHOULD cause the agent
   to remove all keys loaded from that smartcard.

   An agent shall reply with SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS if the key was deleted or
   SSH_AGENT_FAILURE if it was not found.

3.5.  Requesting a list of keys

   A client may request a list of keys from an agent using the following
   message:

       byte             SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES

   The agent shall reply with a message with the following preamble.

       byte             SSH_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER
       uint32           nkeys

   Where "nkeys" indicates the number of keys to follow.  Following the
   preamble are zero or more keys, each encoded as:

       string           key blob
       string           comment

   Where "key blob" is the standard public key encoding of the key
   (Section 3.3) and "comment" is a human-readable comment encoded as a
   UTF-8 string.

3.6.  Private key operations

   A client may request the agent perform a private key signature
   operation using the following message:

       byte             SSH_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST
       string           key blob
       string           data
       uint32           flags

   Where "key blob" is the key requested to perform the signature
   (encoded as per Section 3.3), "data" is the data to be signed and
   "flags" is a bitfield containing the bitwise OR of zero or more
   signature flags (see below).







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   If the agent does not support the requested flags, or is otherwise
   unable or unwilling to generate the signature (e.g.  because it
   doesn't have the specified key, or the user refused confirmation of a
   constrained key), it must reply with a SSH_AGENT_FAILURE message.

   On success, the agent shall reply with:

       byte             SSH_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE
       string           signature

   The signature format is specific to the algorithm of the key type in
   use.  SSH protocol signature formats are defined in [RFC4253] for
   "ssh-rsa" and "ssh-dss" keys, in [RFC5656] for "ecdsa-sha2-*" keys
   and in [RFC8709] for "ssh-ed25519" and "ssh-ed448" keys.

3.6.1.  Signature flags

   Two flags are currently defined for signature request messages:
   SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_256 and SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_512.  These two flags
   are only valid for "ssh-rsa" keys and request that the agent return a
   signature using the "rsa-sha2-256" or "rsa-sha2-512" signature
   methods respectively.  These signature schemes are defined in
   [RFC8332].

3.7.  Locking and unlocking an agent

   The agent protocol supports requesting that an agent temporarily lock
   itself with a pass-phrase.  When locked an agent should suspend
   processing of sensitive operations (private key signature operations
   at the very least) until it has been unlocked with the same pass-
   phrase.

   The following message requests agent locking

       byte             SSH_AGENTC_LOCK
       string           passphrase

   The agent shall reply with SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS if locked successfully
   or SSH_AGENT_FAILURE otherwise (e.g. if the agent was already
   locked).

   The following message requests unlocking an agent:

       byte             SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK
       string           passphrase






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   If the agent is already locked and the pass-phrase matches the one
   used to lock it then it should unlock and reply with
   SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS.  If the agent is unlocked or if the the pass-
   phrase does not match it should reply with SSH_AGENT_FAILURE.  An
   agent SHOULD take countermeasures against brute-force guessing
   attacks against the pass-phrase.

3.8.  Extension mechanism

   The agent protocol includes an optional extension mechanism that
   allows vendor-specific and experimental messages to be sent via the
   agent protocol.  Extension requests from the client consist of:

       byte             SSH_AGENTC_EXTENSION
       string           extension type
       byte[]           extension contents

   The extension type indicates the type of the extension message as a
   UTF-8 string.  Implementation-specific extensions should be suffixed
   by the implementation domain following the extension naming scheme
   defined in Section 4.2 of [RFC4251], e.g. "foo%example.com@localhost".

   An agent that does not support extensions of the supplied type MUST
   reply with an empty SSH_AGENT_FAILURE message.  This reply is also
   sent by agents that do not support the extension mechanism at all.

   The contents of successful extension reply messages are specific to
   the extension type.  Extension requests may return SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS
   on success or some other extension-specific message.

   Extension failure should be signaled using the
   SSH_AGENT_EXTENSION_FAILURE code - extensions should not use the
   standard SSH_AGENT_FAILURE message.  This allows failed requests to
   be distinguished from the extension not being supported.

3.8.1.  Query extension

   A single, optional extension request "query" is defined to allow a
   client to query which, if any, extensions are supported by an agent.

       byte             SSH_AGENTC_EXTENSION
       string           "query"

   If an agent supports the query extension is should reply with a list
   of supported extension names.

       byte             SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS
       string[]         extension type



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4.  Forwarding access to an agent

   The agent protocol may be forwarded over a SSH connection, using the
   [RFC4254] connection protocol, allowing agent forwarding to be
   requested for any session channel, using a model that is similar to
   the connection protocol's support for X11 Forwarding (Section 6.3 of
   [RFC4254]).  This feature is OPTIONAL for SSH protocol and agent
   implementations.

   Note that the deployed integration with the SSH protocol uses vendor-
   specific names.

4.1.  Advertising agent forwarding support

   Support for agent forwarding may be advertised by a SSH protocol
   server using the [RFC8308] extension mechanism using the name "agent-
   forward" in the SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO message.

       string           "agent-forward"
       string           "0" (version)

   Note that this protocol substantially predates the existence of the
   [RFC8308] extension mechanism and several widely-deployed SSH
   implementations that support agent forwarding do not advertise their
   ability to do so.  Clients MAY opportunitically attempt to request
   agent forwarding in the absence of an [RFC8308] advertisment using
   the vendor-specific names mentioned below.  Likewise, servers MAY
   implement the vendor-specific names in addition to the one described
   here.

4.2.  Requesting agent forwarding

   A client may request agent forwarding for a previously-opened session
   (Section 6.1 of [RFC4254]) using the following channel request.  This
   request is sent after the channel has been opened, but before a
   shell, command or subsystem has been executed.

       byte             SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
       string           channel_id
       string           "auth-agent-req%openssh.com@localhost"
       boolean          want_reply

   Where channel_id is the identifier for an established session channel
   (as returned from a previous SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN request, and the
   want_reply flag indicates whether the server should respond with a
   confirmation of whether the request was successful (as specified in
   Section 5.4 of [RFC4254])




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   If a SSH server accepts this request, typically it will arrange to
   make a endpoint (e.g. a listening socket) available and advertise
   this fact to the subordinate session.  Most implementations on Unix-
   like systems do this by providing a user-private listening Unix
   domain socket and recording its location in an environment variable
   $SSH_AUTH_SOCK.

   As mentioned previously, many deployed implementations only support
   the former, pre-standardisation "auth-agent-req%openssh.com@localhost" request
   name.  The latter "agent-req" name SHOULD only be used if support was
   explicitly advertised as per Section 4.1.

4.3.  Agent connection requests

   After a client has requested that a session have agent forwarding
   enabled, the server later may request a connection to the forwarded
   agent.  The server does this by requesting a dedicated channel to
   communicate with the client's agent.

       byte             SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN
       string           "auth-agent%openssh.com@localhost"
       uint32           channel_id
       uint32           local_window
       uint32           local_maxpacket

   The channel_id, local_window and local_maxpacket fields should be
   interpreted as specified by Section 5.1 of [RFC4254].

   As above, the latter "agent-connect" open type name SHOULD only be
   used if support was explicitly advertised as per Section 4.1.

   A client SHOULD be prepared to handle multiple concurrent active
   agent connections.  A client MAY accept agent connection requests
   (subject to authorisation) without a prior agent forwarding request
   having been made to support the situation where agent forwarding
   without opening a session is desired.  Similarly, a client MAY
   continue to accept agent connection requests after the session for
   which agent forwarding was requested has closed.

   A client MUST refuse unauthorised agent connection requests, i.e.
   when agent forwarding was not desired or requested but a a server
   sends an agent connection request anyway.

   Note the connection request provides no way to identify which session
   channel a given agent connection request relates to.  This implies
   that a SSH connection can functionally forward access to only a
   single client-side agent concurrently using this protocol.




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5.  Protocol numbers

5.1.  Message numbers

   The following numbers are used for requests from the client to the
   agent.

       SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES                  11
       SSH_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST                        13
       SSH_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY                        17
       SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY                     18
       SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES               19
       SSH_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED                  25
       SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY                   20
       SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY                21
       SSH_AGENTC_LOCK                                22
       SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK                              23
       SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED       26
       SSH_AGENTC_EXTENSION                           27

   The following numbers are used for replies from the agent to the
   client.

       SSH_AGENT_FAILURE                               5
       SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS                               6
       SSH_AGENT_EXTENSION_FAILURE                     28
       SSH_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER                     12
       SSH_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE                         14

5.1.1.  Reserved message numbers

   The following message numbers are reserved for implementations that
   implement support for the legacy SSH protocol version 1: 1-4, 7-9 and
   24 (inclusive).  These message numbers MAY be used by an
   implementation supporting the legacy protocol but MUST NOT be reused
   otherwise.

   The range of message numbers 240-255 are reserved for organization-
   local extensions to the agent protocol and MUST NOT be used by
   generic implementations.

5.2.  Constraint identifiers

   The following numbers are used to identify key constraints.  These
   are only used in key constraints and are not sent as message numbers.






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       SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME                    1
       SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM                     2
       SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_EXTENSION                   255

5.3.  Signature flags

   The following numbers may be present in signature request
   (SSH_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST) messages.  These flags form a bit field by
   taking the logical OR of zero or more flags.

       SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_256                          2
       SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_512                          4

   The flag value 1 is reserved for historical implementations.

6.  IANA Considerations

   This protocol requires three registries be established, one for
   message numbers, one for constraints and one for signature request
   flags.

6.1.  New registry: SSH agent protocol numbers

   This registry, titled "SSH agent protocol numbers" records the
   message numbers for client requests and agent responses.  Its initial
   state should consist of the following numbers and reservations.
   Future message number allocations shall require specification in the
   form of an RFC (RFC REQUIRED as per [RFC5226]).

   +===========+==========================================+===========+
   | Number(s) | Identifier                               | Reference |
   +===========+==========================================+===========+
   | 1         | reserved                                 | Section   |
   |           |                                          | 5.1.1     |
   +-----------+------------------------------------------+-----------+
   | 2         | reserved                                 | Section   |
   |           |                                          | 5.1.1     |
   +-----------+------------------------------------------+-----------+
   | 3         | reserved                                 | Section   |
   |           |                                          | 5.1.1     |
   +-----------+------------------------------------------+-----------+
   | 4         | reserved                                 | Section   |
   |           |                                          | 5.1.1     |
   +-----------+------------------------------------------+-----------+
   | 5         | SSH_AGENT_FAILURE                        | Section   |
   |           |                                          | 5.1       |
   +-----------+------------------------------------------+-----------+
   | 6         | SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS                        | Section   |



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   |           |                                          | 5.1       |
   +-----------+------------------------------------------+-----------+
   | 7         | reserved                                 | Section   |
   |           |                                          | 5.1.1     |
   +-----------+------------------------------------------+-----------+
   | 8         | reserved                                 | Section   |
   |           |                                          | 5.1.1     |
   +-----------+------------------------------------------+-----------+
   | 9         | reserved                                 | Section   |
   |           |                                          | 5.1.1     |
   +-----------+------------------------------------------+-----------+
   | 10        | reserved                                 | Section   |
   |           |                                          | 5.1.1     |
   +-----------+------------------------------------------+-----------+
   | 11        | SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES            | Section   |
   |           |                                          | 5.1       |
   +-----------+------------------------------------------+-----------+
   | 12        | SSH_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER              | Section   |
   |           |                                          | 5.1       |
   +-----------+------------------------------------------+-----------+
   | 13        | SSH_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST                  | Section   |
   |           |                                          | 5.1       |
   +-----------+------------------------------------------+-----------+
   | 14        | SSH_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE                  | Section   |
   |           |                                          | 5.1       |
   +-----------+------------------------------------------+-----------+
   | 15        | reserved                                 | Section   |
   |           |                                          | 5.1.1     |
   +-----------+------------------------------------------+-----------+
   | 16        | reserved                                 | Section   |
   |           |                                          | 5.1.1     |
   +-----------+------------------------------------------+-----------+
   | 17        | SSH_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY                  | Section   |
   |           |                                          | 5.1       |
   +-----------+------------------------------------------+-----------+
   | 18        | SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY               | Section   |
   |           |                                          | 5.1       |
   +-----------+------------------------------------------+-----------+
   | 19        | SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES         | Section   |
   |           |                                          | 5.1       |
   +-----------+------------------------------------------+-----------+
   | 20        | SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY             | Section   |
   |           |                                          | 5.1       |
   +-----------+------------------------------------------+-----------+
   | 21        | SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY          | Section   |
   |           |                                          | 5.1       |
   +-----------+------------------------------------------+-----------+
   | 22        | SSH_AGENTC_LOCK                          | Section   |



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   |           |                                          | 5.1       |
   +-----------+------------------------------------------+-----------+
   | 23        | SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK                        | Section   |
   |           |                                          | 5.1       |
   +-----------+------------------------------------------+-----------+
   | 24        | reserved                                 | Section   |
   |           |                                          | 5.1.1     |
   +-----------+------------------------------------------+-----------+
   | 25        | SSH_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED            | Section   |
   |           |                                          | 5.1       |
   +-----------+------------------------------------------+-----------+
   | 26        | SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED | Section   |
   |           |                                          | 5.1       |
   +-----------+------------------------------------------+-----------+
   | 27        | SSH_AGENTC_EXTENSION                     | Section   |
   |           |                                          | 5.1       |
   +-----------+------------------------------------------+-----------+
   | 28        | SSH_AGENT_EXTENSION_FAILURE              | Section   |
   |           |                                          | 5.1       |
   +-----------+------------------------------------------+-----------+
   | 240-255   | Reserved for organizational use          | Section   |
   |           |                                          | 5.1       |
   +-----------+------------------------------------------+-----------+

                                 Table 1

6.2.  New registry: SSH agent key constraint numbers

   This registry, titled "SSH agent key constraint numbers" records the
   message numbers for key use constraints.  Its initial state should
   consist of the following numbers.  Future constraint number
   allocations shall require specification in the form of an RFC (RFC
   REQUIRED as per [RFC5226]).

         +========+===============================+=============+
         | Number | Identifier                    | Reference   |
         +========+===============================+=============+
         | 1      | SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME  | Section 5.2 |
         +--------+-------------------------------+-------------+
         | 2      | SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM   | Section 5.2 |
         +--------+-------------------------------+-------------+
         | 255    | SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_EXTENSION | Section 5.2 |
         +--------+-------------------------------+-------------+

                                 Table 2






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6.3.  New registry: SSH agent signature flags

   This registry, titled "SSH agent signature flags records the values
   for signature request (SSH_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST) flag values.  Its
   initial state should consist of the following numbers.  Note that as
   the flags are combined by bitwise OR, all flag values must be powers
   of two and the maximum available flag value is 0x80000000.

   Future constraint number allocations shall require specification in
   the form of an RFC (RFC REQUIRED as per [RFC5226]).

             +========+========================+=============+
             | Number | Identifier             | Reference   |
             +========+========================+=============+
             | 0x01   | reserved               | Section 5.3 |
             +--------+------------------------+-------------+
             | 0x02   | SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_256 | Section 5.3 |
             +--------+------------------------+-------------+
             | 0x04   | SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_512 | Section 5.3 |
             +--------+------------------------+-------------+

                                  Table 3

6.4.  New registry: SSH agent extension request names

   This registry, titled "SSH agent extension request names" records the
   names used in the generic extension request message
   (SSH_AGENTC_EXTENSION).  Its initial state should consist of the
   following names.

   Future constraint number allocations shall require specification in
   the form of an RFC (RFC REQUIRED as per [RFC5226]).

                    +================+===============+
                    | Extension Name | Reference     |
                    +================+===============+
                    | query          | Section 3.8.1 |
                    +----------------+---------------+

                                 Table 4

6.5.  Additions to SSH Extension Names

   IANA is requested to insert the following entries into the table
   Extension Names [IANA-SSH-EXT] under Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol
   Parameters [RFC4250].





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                     +================+=============+
                     | Extension Name | Reference   |
                     +================+=============+
                     | agent-forward  | Section 4.1 |
                     +----------------+-------------+

                                 Table 5

6.6.  Additions to SSH Connection Protocol Channel Request Names

   IANA is requested to insert the following entries into the table
   Connection Protocol Channel Request Names [IANA-SSH-CHANREQ] under
   Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Parameters [RFC4250].

                     +================+=============+
                     | Extension Name | Reference   |
                     +================+=============+
                     | agent-forward  | Section 4.2 |
                     +----------------+-------------+

                                 Table 6

6.7.  Additions to SSH Connection Protocol Channel Types

   IANA is requested to insert the following entries into the table
   Connection Protocol Channel Types [IANA-SSH-CHANTYPE] under Secure
   Shell (SSH) Protocol Parameters [RFC4250].

                     +================+=============+
                     | Extension Name | Reference   |
                     +================+=============+
                     | agent-connect  | Section 4.3 |
                     +----------------+-------------+

                                 Table 7

7.  Security Considerations

   The agent is a service that is tasked with retaining and providing
   controlled access to what are typically long-lived login
   authentication credentials.  It is by nature a sensitive and trusted
   software component.  Moreover, the agent protocol itself does not
   include any authentication or transport security; ability to
   communicate with an agent is usually sufficient to invoke it to
   perform private key operations.






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   Since being able to access an agent is usually sufficient to perform
   private key operations, it is critically important that the agent
   only be exposed to its owner and their authorised delegates.

   The primary design intention of an agent is that an attacker with
   unprivileged access to their victim's agent should be prevented from
   gaining a copy of any keys that have been loaded into it.  This may
   not preclude the attacker from stealing use of those keys (e.g.  if
   they have been loaded without a confirmation constraint).

   Given this, the agent should, as far as possible, prevent its memory
   being read by other processes to direct theft of loaded keys.  This
   typically include disabling debugging interfaces and preventing
   process memory dumps on abnormal termination.

   Another, more subtle, means by which keys may be stolen are via
   cryptographic side-channels.  Private key operations may leak
   information about the contents of keys via differences in timing,
   power use or by side-effects in the memory subsystems (e.g.  CPU
   caches) of the host running the agent.  For the case of a local
   attacker and an agent holding unconstrained keys, the only limit on
   the number of private key operations the attacker may be able to
   observe is the rate at which the CPU can perform signatures.  This
   grants the attacker an almost ideal oracle for side-channel attacks.
   While a full treatment of side-channel attacks is beyond the scope of
   this specification, agents SHOULD use cryptographic implementations
   that are resistant to side-channel attacks and MAY take additional
   measures to hide the actual time spent processing private key
   operations.

   Forwarding access to a local agent over a SSH connection (Section 4)
   inherently creates a transitive trust relationship.  SSH
   implementations SHOULD NOT forward use of an agent by default and MAY
   implement additional controls over key visibility and use for
   forwarded agent connections.

8.  References

8.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.







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   [RFC4250]  Lehtinen, S. and C. Lonvick, Ed., "The Secure Shell (SSH)
              Protocol Assigned Numbers", RFC 4250,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4250, January 2006,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4250>.

   [RFC4251]  Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, Ed., "The Secure Shell (SSH)
              Protocol Architecture", RFC 4251, DOI 10.17487/RFC4251,
              January 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4251>.

   [RFC4253]  Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, Ed., "The Secure Shell (SSH)
              Transport Layer Protocol", RFC 4253, DOI 10.17487/RFC4253,
              January 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4253>.

   [RFC4254]  Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, Ed., "The Secure Shell (SSH)
              Connection Protocol", RFC 4254, DOI 10.17487/RFC4254,
              January 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4254>.

   [RFC5226]  Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
              IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", RFC 5226,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5226, May 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5226>.

   [RFC5656]  Stebila, D. and J. Green, "Elliptic Curve Algorithm
              Integration in the Secure Shell Transport Layer",
              RFC 5656, DOI 10.17487/RFC5656, December 2009,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5656>.

   [RFC8032]  Josefsson, S. and I. Liusvaara, "Edwards-Curve Digital
              Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)", RFC 8032,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8032, January 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8032>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8308]  Bider, D., "Extension Negotiation in the Secure Shell
              (SSH) Protocol", RFC 8308, DOI 10.17487/RFC8308, March
              2018, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8308>.

   [RFC8332]  Bider, D., "Use of RSA Keys with SHA-256 and SHA-512 in
              the Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol", RFC 8332,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8332, March 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8332>.







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   [RFC8709]  Harris, B. and L. Velvindron, "Ed25519 and Ed448 Public
              Key Algorithms for the Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol",
              RFC 8709, DOI 10.17487/RFC8709, February 2020,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8709>.

   [FIPS.186-4]
              National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Digital
              Signature Standard (DSS)", FIPS PUB 186-4, July 2013.

8.2.  Informative References

   [IANA-SSH-CHANREQ]
              IANA, "Connection Protocol Channel Types",
              <https://www.iana.org/assignments/ssh-parameters/>.

   [IANA-SSH-CHANTYPE]
              IANA, "Extension Names",
              <https://www.iana.org/assignments/ssh-parameters/>.

   [IANA-SSH-EXT]
              IANA, "Connection Protocol Channel Request Names",
              <https://www.iana.org/assignments/ssh-parameters/>.

   [draft-ietf-secsh-agent-02]
              Ylonen, T., Rinne, T. J., and S. Lehtinen, "Secure Shell
              Authentication Agent Protocol", January 2004,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-secsh-
              agent-02>.

Acknowledgements

   This protocol was designed and first implemented by Markus Friedl,
   based on a similar protocol for an agent to support the legacy SSH
   version 1 by Tatu Ylonen.

   Thanks to Simon Tatham and Niels Möller who reviewed and helped
   improve this document.

Author's Address

   Damien Miller
   OpenSSH
   Email: djm%openssh.com@localhost
   URI:   https://www.openssh.com/







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